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General hospitals across the world are becoming larger (i.e. admitting more patients each year) and more
complex (i.e. offering a wider range of services to patients with more diverse care needs). Prior work suggests
that an increase in patient volume in a hospital service is associated with reduced costs per patient in that
service. However, it is unclear how volume changes in one service affect the costs of the other services in
the same hospital. This paper investigates such volume-cost spillover effects between elective and emergency
admissions and across specialties, using condition-level panel data comprising all acute hospital trusts in
England over a period of ten years. We provide evidence that increased elective volume at a hospital
is associated with an increase in the cost of emergency care (a negative spillover). Furthermore, for
emergency admissions, we find evidence that increased emergency activity in one specialty is associated with
lower costs of emergency care in other specialties (a positive spillover). By contrast, we find no evidence
of spillover effects across specialties for elective admissions. We discuss the implications of these findings for
individual hospital growth strategies and for the regional organization of hospital systems.
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1. Introduction
Scale is an important determinant of productivity and a recurrent theme in the operations man-
agement and economics literature. Although scale is generally associated with higher productivity
(Panzar and Willig 1977), scholars have pointed out that the productivity gains of increased output
have to be traded off against potential productivity losses caused by an increased heterogeneity of
that output (Penrose 1959, Schoar 2002). The tension between benefits of scale and potential dis-
benefits of scope is of particular concern in the hospital industry (Argote 1982, Clark and Huckman
2012, Gaynor et al. 2015). General hospitals provide a large and diverse range of services and use
a wide array of technologies and expertise. From both a strategic and operational perspective, this
diversity is surprising. At the strategic level, it is at odds with the focus principle (Skinner 1974),
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and at the process level, it impedes improvement techniques that are based on the reduction-of-
variation principle (Hopp and Spearman 2004). Recent studies have discussed the impact of the
scope of hospital services on service quality (e.g. Clark and Huckman 2012, Kuntz et al. 2018). By
contrast, this paper focuses on the cost implications of scope – how a volume change in one service
affects the costs per patient of other services in the hospital.
More specifically, we estimate the magnitude of two types of cost spillovers, those associated with
a change in volume of patients admitted to the hospital from different medical specialties,1 and
those associated with a change in the volume of patients admitted through different channels (i.e.,
emergency versus elective admissions).2 As we will see, from a theoretical perspective, arguments
can be put forward both for positive and negative volume spillover effects. The direction and size of
the effect is therefore an empirical question. More importantly, the existence of positive or negative
spillovers along these two dimensions has practical implications for hospital organization. Positive
spillovers constitute an argument for ever-larger integrated general hospitals where different medical
specialties are collocated and where care for both emergency and elective cases is provided. In
contrast, negative spillovers provide support to the notion of relocating elective specialty care away
from the general hospital to stand-alone elective specialty units, as championed by some industry
observers (Christensen et al. 2009, Dabhilkar and Svarts 2019).
Past cost studies of such scope effects have been impeded by a lack of sufficiently granular costing
data. This paper overcomes this limitation by using a comprehensive dataset of annual average
cost data of nearly 145 million hospital admissions for over 2,000 conditions treated in all 157 acute
care trusts in England over a period of ten years. Since the data is longitudinal and comprised of
multiple specialties across multiple hospitals, we estimate the volume effects of interest both within
hospitals over time and between hospitals, using within- and between-random-effects multilevel
modeling (Mundlak 1978, Gelman and Hill 2007).
In line with extant literature, we find strong evidence of economies of scale within services. The
more elective patients a hospital treats within a specialty, the lower the cost of these patients
(a 10% increase in volume between hospitals is associated with a cost reduction per patient by
0.48%). Similarly, if the number of emergency patients in a specialty increases, the cost of these
1 Medical specialties are typically organized around specific body parts (e.g. eye, heart), systems (e.g. nervous system,
respiratory system), or diseases (e.g. cancer, metabolic diseases) and may share some resources required for patient
care (e.g. diagnostic equipment), while other resources are specialty-specific (e.g. specialist physicians).
2 Elective admissions range from simple day cases (e.g. hernia repairs) and short stays (e.g. joint replacements) to
complex, long-stay operations (e.g. open-heart surgery), and are typically planned in advance along a well-defined
treatment plan. Emergency admissions originate at the emergency department where patients present with symptoms
that need to be diagnosed and treated often under significant time pressure (RCS/DH 2010, AHRQ 2014).
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patients decreases (a 10% increase in volume between hospitals is associated with a 1.44% reduc-
tion in patient-level costs). Turning to the main focus of this paper, the volume spillover effects
between admission categories and specialties, we find that the productivity of emergency services
are significantly affected, both positively and negatively, by volume spillovers from other activities.
First, an increase in the volume of emergency patients in a specialty will lead to an increase in
the productivity of emergency care in other specialties (a 10% increase in patient volume in other
specialties is associated with an average cost reduction of 1.10% in a focal specialty). Second, an
increase in volume of elective patients, either in the same or from other specialties, has a neg-
ative effect on emergency productivity (a 10% increase in elective patients within the specialty
increases emergency costs by 0.31%, while a 10% increase in elective patients in all other specialties
increases emergency costs by 1.37%). By contrast, we find no evidence that elective productivity in
a specialty is affected by volume spillover effects. An increase in the volume of emergency patients
within the specialty or of the volume of elective or emergency patients in other specialties has no
significant effect on the cost of elective patients in the focal specialty. These results are robust
to alternative model specifications and we can rule out alternative explanations for these findings
(e.g. reverse causality, patient selection effects, and endogenous specialty composition).
These findings have important practical implications at both the hospital management and
regional policy level. At the hospital level, they suggest that elective care growth strategies – which
are often pursued by hospitals to improve overall productivity because elective care has greater
standardization potential and, therefore, productivity gains are deemed easier to achieve – may
actually lead to a drop in productivity overall because of the unintended negative spillover effect on
emergency service productivity. To demonstrate this, we perform a counterfactual analysis based
on a large hospital in the metropolitan area of London and show that a 20% increase in hospital
admissions across both admission categories leads to a cost saving of 1.3%; however, increasing
elective admissions alone by the same number of patients leads to a 2.0% reduction in elective
costs but increases emergency costs by 6.7%, leading to a total cost increase of 3.3%. Surprisingly,
a targeted emergency growth strategy expanding emergency admissions alone by the same number
of patients, much less favored by hospital managers due to the complexity of emergency care,
is estimated to lead to a cost saving of 7.3% in emergency services without having a significant
negative effect on elective care productivity, resulting in a total cost saving of 5.1%. At the regional
policy level, our results suggest that redistributing hospital services could lead to an aggregate
reduction in the cost of providing care. A counterfactual analysis shows that if pairs of hospitals
in the London area worked together and redistributed elective specialties so that only one of two
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hospitals provided any particular service, then the cost of elective treatments could be 3.6% lower
without a substantial change in the hospitals’ total admissions volumes.
Our findings also provide additional support for a more radical proposal to separate out elective
services from acute hospitals and provide them in organizationally separate treatment centers, each
focused on a relatively narrow set of related services. Physicians and health management researchers
have repeatedly called for such reorganization (ASGBI 2007, RCS/DH 2007, Christensen et al.
2009, Bohmer 2009, Hopp and Lovejoy 2012, Monitor 2015), and there is evidence to suggest that
this would offer quality benefits across the system (RCS/DH 2007, Kuntz et al. 2018). Our findings
complement these studies by providing evidence that such a reorganization would also result in
productivity gains. Extending the counterfactual analysis, we estimate, for example, that if London
were to operate stand-alone elective treatment centers focused on single specialties only, then
elective costs could potentially be reduced by 13.6%. Note, though, that while these counterfactual
analyses suggest productivity gains, there will be other reasons – such as patient access, teaching
arrangements, or physician preferences – that make such dramatic redesigns difficult to implement.
2. Existing Literature
The empirical literature examining economies of scale in hospitals is quite extensive (see Giancotti
et al. (2017) for a recent survey). Although the majority of studies find evidence of the existence
of economies of scale, their magnitude and moderating circumstances remain subjects of debate
(Aletras 1997, Posnett 2002). From an empirical perspective, identifying the magnitude of scale
economies is challenging as estimations may be confounded by unmeasured inter-hospital variation
in quality, patient mix and severity, cost accounting and reporting procedures, or the degree of
utilization of existing capacity (Dranove 1998, Posnett 2002, Kristensen et al. 2008). The study
of scale economies also poses theoretical challenges since economies of scale may arise through
several causal mechanisms (Dranove 1998), including the spreading of fixed costs (Moore 1959),
learning and innovation (Pisano et al. 2001), and new and better utilization of capacity (Hopp and
Lovejoy 2012, Argote 2013). This causal complexity suggests that the degree to which scale affects
productivity depends on the organizational level at which the analysis takes place.
Most studies investigate scale economies at either the level of the hospital as a whole (e.g.
Marini and Miraldo 2009) or the level of a particular patient condition (e.g. Gaughan et al. 2012).
However, the insights into scale effects that can be expected by studying either level in isolation
have their limitations (Panzar and Willig 1977). On the one hand, scale at the hospital level is often
a consequence of the pooling of heterogeneous services. These studies underestimate the economies
achievable through smart pooling of more closely related activities (Dijk and Sluis 2004, Joustra
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et al. 2010, Vanberkel et al. 2012) to create positive synergies. Studies at the condition level also
fail to account for any positive or negative spillover effects on the productivity of other services
(Schilling et al. 2003, Clark and Huckman 2012). In multi-product firms, these spillovers onto the
productivity of one output resulting from a change in the scale of other outputs are referred to
as economies of scope (Panzar and Willig 1981). Hospital level economies of scale studies thus
conflate scale and scope, effectively taking the hospital to be a single-product firm that produces
an “average” patient (Kim 1987), while condition level studies disregard the spillover effects onto
other services altogether.
That said, a few studies in the healthcare-economics literature have attempted to investigate
economies of scope in hospital care. (A summary of the data, methods, and findings of these studies
can be found in §EC.11 of the online supplement.) However, these studies have significant data
limitations. The majority use hospital-level annualized costs and can only distinguish between
scope effects arising from the co-production of hospital services at a high level of aggregation, e.g.
between inpatient, outpatient, and ambulatory services as opposed to individual medical specialties
(Preyra and Pink 2006, Carey et al. 2015). These issues are summarized in a 2012 report by
Monitor, the UK healthcare regulator, on scale and scope in healthcare markets, in which they
state that (Monitor 2012):
Given the importance of economies of scale and scope [in hospitals] it is perhaps surprising
that so little is known about their extent and importance. A systematic literature survey as part
of this study revealed very little evidence (either positive or negative) about the issue. Many
of the existing studies focus on the “whole hospital” rather than particular services and even
those studies are often very limited by poor data and methodologies.”
More recently, Gaynor et al. (2015) have investigated economies of scope using data from 324
California hospitals in a single year, 2003. They use the data to estimate a hospital cost function
of the form
Cost =C
[
(Qρ111 + · · ·+Qρ11N)
1
ρ1 , ..., (Q
ρk
k1 + · · ·+QρkkN)
1
ρk ,w
]
, (1)
where Qij is the hospital’s aggregate output of service type i produced by specialty j and w is a
vector of input prices. The degree of scope economies within service type i is determined by the
parameter ρi. Gaynor et al. (2015) use three service types (k= 3) – primary, secondary and tertiary
care – and find evidence of economies of scope across specialties for primary care and diseconomies
for secondary and tertiary care. Our paper differs in a number of aspects from this paper. First,
their data does not include hospital costs at the condition (DRG) level and they therefore have to
combine patient-level hospital charges and aggregate hospital costs to estimate them. This requires
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assumptions about the form of the cost function in Equation (1), such as symmetric specialty
effects within service types, that we can avoid with our data. Second, our data spans 10 years and
therefore allows us to differentiate between cross-sectional and longitudinal effects and to better
account for unobserved heterogeneity, which we discuss further in §4.3 and §6, respectively. Third,
our service types are different. We do not distinguish between primary, secondary and tertiary care
services as service types but instead between emergency and elective services. This difference is
particularly relevant from a healthcare operations perspective because these services have different
operational characteristics, which we will discuss in §3.3.
We also note that the sign and magnitude of spillover effects cannot be deduced by examining
the empirical evidence from other industries. Although evidence from other industries shows that
economies of scale are, for the most part, pervasive (Junius 1997), there is conflicting evidence as
to the extent and direction of scope effects. Benefits have been demonstrated to exist in contexts
such as drug R&D (Henderson and Cockburn 1996) and advertising (Silk and Berndt 1993), while
diseconomies have been found in others such as transportation (Rawley and Simcoe 2010) and
automobile assembly (Fisher and Ittner 1999). In industries such as manufacturing (Kekre and
Srinivasan 1990, Schoar 2002), airlines (Gimeno and Woo 1999, Tsikriktsis 2007) and education
(Sav 2004) the evidence is often conflicting and may depend on the level of analysis. Given that
prior work suggests that scope effects may be context specific, coupled with the fact that the
hospital sector has a number of idiosyncratic differences to other industries, the measurement of
productivity spillovers requires an empirical approach.
3. Economies of Scale and Scope in Hospital Care
In studying scale and scope economies, we are interested in identifying the impact of changes in
patient volumes on the cost of delivering care for a group of “similar” patients (we define what
we mean by similar at the end of this Section). We call these the focal patients. Scale effects are
thus defined as the impact of a change in the volume of patients within the focal category on the
cost of these patients. Spillover effects, on the other hand, arise through changes in the volume of
patients who do not belong to the focal category, who we call non-focal patients. Specifically, if
we let V olf and V olnf denote the volume of the focal and non-focal patients, respectively, then
the cost of delivering care to the focal patients, Costf , can be approximated by a linear regression
model that takes the form:
Costf = α+βscaleV olf +βspillV olnf +  (2)
where the coefficients βscale and βspill give the direction and size of the scale and spillover effects,
respectively. The rest of this section is dedicated to a discussion of different mechanisms that may
affect the direction of these two effects.
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3.1. Economies of Scale
Hospitals are largely fixed cost operations, and those that treat more patients are able to spread
their fixed costs across a wider activity base, thereby reducing the average cost per patient (Moore
1959). Not only are assets better utilized at higher patient volumes, but returns on investment are
improved making it more likely that productivity-improving assets are economical in the first place
(Argote 2013). Higher volume also provides more flexibility in choosing asset configurations and
in organizing resources, e.g. through division of labor and specialization (Staats and Gino 2012,
Argote 2013). These improved asset and process structures allow the corresponding activities to
be performed more effectively and efficiently, which should result in lower costs (Porter 1979). A
higher volume of patients also leads to statistical economies of pooling: Higher operating volumes
reduce the coefficient of variation of patient arrivals, meaning that service systems can achieve
the same service service level with less surplus capacity. This statistical pooling effect is especially
relevant in the hospital context, where outcomes can be highly contingent on patients being seen
in a timely manner (see e.g. AHRQ 2014, Chan et al. 2017), and therefore, safety concerns often
necessitate high levels of staffing and, consequently, high labor costs – which are estimated to
constitute more than half of hospital expenses (Guerin-Calvert 2011, Hurst and Williams 2012).
At higher volumes there are also more opportunities for individuals and organizations to learn,
and there is evidence that with additional accumulated experience individuals and organizations
become more productive and effective in completing tasks (Pisano et al. 2001, Nembhard and
Tucker 2011, Argote 2013). Quality improvements have also been attributed to organizational
learning at high volumes (Li and Rajagopalan 1998, KC and Staats 2012, Ramdas et al. 2017).
The medical literature complements the management literature and provides strong evidence of a
positive association between volume and clinical outcomes across a variety of clinical conditions and
surgical procedures (Begg et al. 1998, Birkmeyer et al. 2002). Providers that see a high volume of
similar patients not only gain experience and become more effective in applying a given standard of
care, they also are more innovative and develop new routines for improving service delivery (Porter
and Teisberg 2006, Christensen et al. 2009). The improvements in service quality and effectiveness
expected as a consequence of learning and experience from higher volumes should thus impact
positively on productivity and reduce costs.
Past literature thus provides evidence that treating a higher volume of the focal patients should
allow hospitals to deliver care at a lower cost for these patients, i.e. βscale < 0 in Equation (2).
3.2. Economies of Scope and Spillovers
The existence of productivity spillover effects (positive or negative) from the non-focal activity
onto the cost of the focal activity is less clear. In particular, these spillover effects may depend on
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the degree to which the other activities are related to the focal activity. When inputs are shared
or utilized jointly by related activities, synergistic economies can be realized leading to reduced
costs of production across activities (Panzar and Willig 1977, Hill and Hoskisson 1987). Porter
(1985) distinguishes between two possible sources of such synergies: those arising from tangible
interrelations between activities – resulting from, e.g., the sharing of raw materials, technology,
and production processes – and those arising from intangible interrelations – resulting from, e.g.,
opportunities to apply learning from one situation to another. Thus, the more related the activ-
ities, the more advantages there are to be gained from providing these activities alongside each
other at higher volumes. Schilling et al. (2003) show, for example, that there are positive learning
spillovers when teams perform tasks that are different but related to a focal task, though the more
unrelated the tasks the less opportunities there are for accumulated knowledge transfer. Overall,
these mechanisms are likely to lead to positive productivity spillovers from increased scale of one
activity to other activities.
There may also be negative spillovers that counteract the synergies achievable by pooling across
different activities. First, as the volume of patients from the non-focal activity increases, the less
well-configured will be the hospital’s operational elements towards delivering efficient and effec-
tive care in the focal service (Skinner 1974, Christensen et al. 2009). More specifically, tensions
may arise as a result of substantial differences in the optimal configuration of hospital physical
assets (e.g. operating theatres, patient wards, diagnostic labs) and patient pathways of care (e.g.
clinical investigations and diagnosis, admission, treatment, discharge) required for the treatment
of different types of patients. For example, Huckman and Zinner (2008) show that clinical trial
performance improves if they are conducted in sites that do not also provide traditional patient
services. Second, the more patients of the non-focal type are treated, the more resources, human
capital, and managerial attention will be engaged in potentially conflicting or competing activities
(Hyer et al. 2009). In their seminal paper, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) use the idea of the “dom-
inant logic” to describe this phenomenon. They define the concept of a dominant logic “as the
way in which managers conceptualize the business and make critical resource decisions that link
diversity and performance within an organization.” In a diversified firm, as a focal business area
increases in volume, the dominant logic shifts in its direction. This can lead to reduced allocation of
attention, critical resources, and investments in the other areas relative to the focal area, resulting
in worse performance for these other areas. Third, an increase in the volume of any activity will
naturally allow for a higher degree of specialization within that activity; this is one of the reasons
that volume is associated with higher productivity (see §3.1). Nevertheless, the greater degree of
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specialization may also increase coordination costs as the hospital needs to actively manage the
interdependencies between different activities, which operate increasingly in functional silos (Becker
and Murphy 1992). When these interdependencies are complex, as is typically the case in hospital
care, the increase in coordination costs may result in worse productivity (Zhou 2011). Fourth, with
an increase in the volume of other activities, the contribution of the focal service to the overall
output and financial performance of the hospital as a whole goes down. This may induce shirking
behavior, since the success of the hospital is less dependent on the performance of the focal service,
reducing motivation to engage in cost reduction activities (Williamson 1975, Becker and Murphy
1992). As a consequence, the cost of delivering care in the focal specialty may increase.
The negative spillover effects discussed above may counteract the positive spillover effects caused
by tangible and intangible interrelations. As a consequence, it is not possible to hypothesize the
sign of the spillover effects from the non-focal activity onto cost of the focal service, and it becomes
necessary to estimate the sign of βspill in Equation (2) empirically.
3.3. Characterizing Spillovers
In the context of hospital care, to divide the patients into the focal versus non-focal groups we
separate them along two dimensions: their admission type (elective or emergency) and the medical
specialty associated with their condition (e.g. cardiac, respiratory, etc.). Focal patients are those
patients who share the same admission category and same specialty (e.g., emergency cardiac,
elective respiratory). We can then separate the non-focal patients into three distinct groups: (i)
patients from the same specialty but of the other admission type, (ii) patients of the same admission
type but other specialties, and (iii) patients both of the other admission type and from other
specialties. These definitions give rise to three potential spillover effects.
Examining spillover effects across different medical specialties is a natural question that has
been studied by past literature (e.g., Clark 2012, Gaynor et al. 2015), albeit with the data lim-
itations discussed in §2. In the context of the earlier discussion, it should be clear that, on the
one hand, patients treated across different specialties may share resources that can lead to positive
productivity spillovers arising through tangible and intangible interrelations. On the other hand,
each medical specialty also requires customized assets and specialized human capital and needs to
coordinate with other specialties with which it is also competing for limited resources. This may
lead to negative spillover effects.
Examining spillover effects across different admission types is important and has, to the best of
our knowledge, not been done before in the literature. Emergency and elective patients differ from
each other on multiple dimensions that are worth describing further. Emergency patients arrive
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to the hospital randomly, with poorly specified and often urgent needs. The quality and efficiency
of their care depends on the speed and accuracy of the search process for the root cause and the
most appropriate treatment. This process is often highly variable, and so benefits from effective
knowledge exchange and broad and flexible systems of coordinated care (Enthoven and Tollen
2005, Christensen et al. 2009). In contrast, elective patients typically are scheduled and arrive
with well-diagnosed conditions and a clear treatment plan. The service for these patients is not as
time-critical. The treating physician will have typically assessed them in an outpatient office before
admission to the hospital and their symptoms are well-diagnosed before a hospital appointment is
made to carry out a clearly defined procedure. To be effective and efficient, these care processes
should leave no room for trial and error and deliver predictable outcomes consistently. Clearly,
the two types of patients may well utilize similar resources and human capital, especially within
a specialty. Nevertheless, the differences in the way these two types of patients need to be treated
(planned versus unplanned) gives rise to operational tensions that may well prove detrimental to
productivity (Christensen et al. 2009).
It is important to emphasize that measuring the sign and magnitude of spillover effects is not
only of academic interest, but that the level of analysis and distinction between economies of
scale and economies of scope also matters for practical reasons. If, on the one hand, economies of
scale are present primarily at the specialty level, with little spillover to other specialties, then this
would support calls for greater specialization, with patients being referred to highly specialized
hospitals that act as focused factories (Skinner 1974) that perform with greater efficiency and
foster innovation better (Greenwald et al. 2006, Porter and Teisberg 2006). If, on the other hand,
economies of both scale and scope are achieved by providing care at high volumes regardless of
the specialty, then this would support the call for small general hospitals to be closed and activity
to be pooled in large, comprehensive regional general hospitals (West 1998). In addition, studying
the spillovers between admission types allows us to comment further on how these hospitals should
be structured. At present, general hospitals treat both emergencies and electives. To the extent
that there are negative spillovers between the two patient types, it might be more economical to
separate out elective care from emergency care. To our awareness, this is the first study that is able
to comment on the productivity implications of operating multi-specialty mixed service (elective
and emergency) acute hospitals, the configuration of the majority of hospitals worldwide.
4. Data, Variable Definitions, and Econometric Models
The primary data set for this study consists of annual costing and inpatient activity data for the
ten financial years from 2006/07 to 2015/16 for all acute hospital trusts operated by the National
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Health Service (NHS) in England. Acute NHS hospital trusts provide secondary and tertiary care
in facilities that range from small district hospitals to large teaching hospitals. Services include
emergency departments (EDs), inpatient and outpatient medicine and surgery, and specialist med-
ical services. We focus our attention on admitted patient care and exclude outpatient activity and
ED visits that do not result in hospital admission. In total, our data comprises aggregate annual
information for nearly 145 million patient admissions to 157 acute hospital trusts. As a number of
trusts were merged during the observation period, whenever a trust merges with another we treat
the new organization as a distinct entity, increasing the effective number of trusts from 157 to 169.
For regulatory purposes, each hospital trust is mandated to complete an annual return of so-called
reference costs, reporting the trust’s activity for each patient condition treated over the preceding
year. Patient conditions are defined using so-called healthcare resource groups (HRGs), which are
the UK equivalent of the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) used by Medicare in the US. HRGs are
designed so that patients within an HRG are clinically similar and require a relatively homogeneous
bundle of resources for their treatment (Fetter 1991). Each patient admission is assigned to a
unique HRG using an automated process based on information provided in the discharge notes,
including standardized ICD-10 medical diagnosis codes, OPCS procedure codes, and contextual
information such as patient age, gender and the existence of any complications or comorbidities
(see e.g. DH 2013). The costs incurred by a hospital each year are allocated to specific HRGs, with
each hospital reporting the average cost of treating patients within each HRG, the average length
of stay (LOS) of these patients, and the volume of patients treated from each HRG. The primary
data set is comprised of just under 10.4 million of these HRG-level submissions.
These cost submissions are used by the UK Department of Health to determine the price (also
known as the “tariff”) to be paid to hospitals for each discharged patient in an HRG in the following
financial year. While the specifics are complex, the main principle is to reimburse hospitals per
patient at a rate that is close to the national average cost of providing treatment for the specific
HRG to which each patient is assigned. The intention behind this benchmarking approach is to
generate cost reduction incentives (see Shleifer 1985, Savva et al. 2018). Since the reported costs
are critical for hospital reimbursement, it is of paramount importance that they are reliable and
comparable across hospitals. To ensure that this is the case, hospitals are issued with extensive
guidelines on how to allocate direct, indirect, and overhead costs to different HRGs (e.g. HFMA
2016) and the UK Department of Health commissions regular independent audits. In 2010, halfway
through our observation period, the UK Audit Commission, a statutory corporation that performs
regular audits of public bodies in the UK, performed a comprehensive audit of the data accuracy
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of seven years of NHS reference cost submissions (UKAC 2011). The report concluded that “most
trusts’ reference costs submissions were accurate in total.” Nevertheless, the report also noted that
“the accuracy of individual unit costs varied and, in some cases, was poor.” We address this point
in our definition of specialties.
Specialty Categories. Although each individual HRG can be thought of as a distinct specialty,
we have chosen to define specialties at a coarser level for two reasons. First, HRG codes are updated
annually and have become more granular over time; the number of HRG codes in our data increases
every year, from 1,149 in 2006/07 to 2,440 in 2015/16, leading to a total of 4,749 unique HRG codes
in our data. To account for this change in coding over time, we are able to map these 4,749 codes
to a set of 496 time-invariant HRG roots using a publicly available data source intended for this
purpose (HSCIC 2015). These HRG roots group similar HRGs together. Each HRG root then falls
within one of 21 HRG chapters, which we subset to 16 clinically meaningful core HRG chapters that
correspond to the major body systems, e.g. nervous or respiratory system, or to particular medical
specialties, e.g. obstetrics or cardiac conditions.3 Although two identical patients in different years
may be assigned different HRG codes or, to a lesser extent, different HRG roots, it is unlikely
that they would be allocated to different HRG chapters. The HRG chapters, therefore, provide
time-consistent clusters of patients with related conditions, which we define as medical specialties
for the purpose of this study.
The second reason for choosing this higher level of aggregation has to do with concerns about the
reliability of cost allocations at the individual HRG level. Cost allocation conventions for specific
HRG codes within HRG chapters can vary significantly between hospitals, but any such deviations
within chapters average out when aggregated to the chapter level. This results in considerably
more consistent cost allocations at the HRG chapter level. This was confirmed by a former director
of costing at the UK Healthcare Financial Management Association, the main advisory body for
3 Of the five HRG chapters that we exclude, two – corresponding to diagnostic imaging (Chapters R) and vascular
procedures & disorders (Chapter Y), which make up less than 0.5% of total costs – are dropped as they were not in
use for more than half of the observation period (all others are available for all 10 years). The third HRG chapter we
drop (Chapter U) is used only in rare instances where patients cannot be assigned to an HRG, which occurs in only
0.06% of cases. The fourth chapter dropped (Chapter S) corresponds to “Haematology, Chemotherapy, Radiotherapy
and Specialist Palliative Care.” This chapter contains certain expensive service elements that have been “unbundled”
from the core HRG and are reimbursed separately. Since patients can be assigned both a core HRG plus one or more
of these unbundled HRGs, inclusion of this unbundled activity will result in inflation of patient volumes which is
our main independent variable of interest; hence, we drop this chapter. Finally, the fifth chapter dropped (Chapter
W) is a mixture of various activities that do not clinically belong together, including treatment of mental health
patients (by non-mental health professionals), non-admitted consultations, poisoning and special examinations, as
well as infectious diseases and immune system disorders. Results remain consistent if we reintroduce into the sample
the last two of these HRG chapters. In total these dropped activities constitute only 6.05% of total costs. In our
analysis we include a control variable to account for this excluded activity – see §4.4.
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the financial governance of hospitals in the UK. We note that a similar aggregation approach to
that described above has been adopted in related empirical research (e.g. Greenwald et al. 2006,
Clark 2012, Clark and Huckman 2012). A list of the specialties (i.e. HRG chapters) included in
this study appears in the caption of Figure 2.
To further alleviate concerns about the reliability of cost accounting, we corroborate the results
of the costing analysis with a length-of-stay (LOS) analysis; LOS does not suffer from accounting
errors (as patient admission and discharge dates are easy to capture) and is highly correlated with
hospital costs.
Admission Categories. Every hospital reports for each HRG the costs, volume, and LOS
for three patient admission categories: (1) day cases, (2) elective inpatients, and (3) emergency
(non-elective) inpatients. In contrast to emergency admissions, elective inpatient and day-patient
admissions are scheduled in advance, with the former including at least one overnight stay in a
hospital bed. When the national tariff for an HRG is calculated the standard approach is to treat
day cases and elective inpatients as substitutable and to reimburse at the same rate. We follow this
approach and merge day cases and elective inpatients, leaving two admission categories: electives
(El) and emergencies (Em). (In §6.3 we discuss an alternative model in which day cases and
elective inpatients are treated as distinct admission categories.)
Note that elective and emergency patients may be assigned to the same HRG code but, impor-
tantly for our analysis, the costs, LOS, and activity data are reported separately for each admission
category. One complication is that, due to a coding convention, all obstetric activity is recorded as
emergency/unplanned (and insufficient information is available to manually separate this out into
elective versus emergency activity). Therefore, we have removed the specialty for obstetric services
from the sample. Since obstetrics typically operates as a stand-alone service within a hospital this
is unlikely to have much bearing on the results. However, as it accounts for 9.1% of costs amongst
the core HRGs we include in our models a control variable to account for its removal – see §4.4.
Data Hierarchy and Unit of Analysis. Within each admission category (emergency or elec-
tive), each observation belongs to two (non-nested) levels: the specialty and the hospital trust.
Time is a third level. The data set contains 21,510 specialty-trust-years across 15 medical specialties
observed longitudinally over 1,434 trust–years. After removing three specialty–trust–years where
no data in the multiple trauma specialty was observed, we obtain 21,507 specialty–trust–years
for the analysis of emergency admissions. For elective admissions, we drop the multiple trauma
specialty, for which all patients are emergency admissions, and 19 additional specialty–trust–years
for which no patients were admitted in that specialty–trust–year, resulting in 20,057 observations
for the analysis of elective admissions.
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4.1. Dependent Variables
The main dependent variables in this study are the average costs per patient for (a) emergency and
(b) elective hospital admissions. As discussed above, we complement this analysis with an additional
measure, the average LOS per patient for the two admission categories. For the purposes of our
study we adjust the average cost and LOS per admission-type–specialty–trust–year to account for
(i) cost variation between hospitals due to regional factors, (ii) cost and LOS variation within
a specialty between hospitals, due to differences in the case-mix within the specialty, and (iii)
heterogeneity in the cost and LOS distribution between specialties and over time. Our approach is
very similar to that used by the UK government to calculate hospital-level reference cost indices
for comparing the relative efficiency of hospitals (see e.g. DH 2016, Chp. 4), except that we adjust
costs and LOS at the level of the specialty instead of a hospital, and also introduce step (ii). We
provide more details on these adjustments below.4
Regional Cost Adjustment. We account for regional differences as costs may vary due to
local factors outside the hospital trusts’ control, e.g. regional variation in the cost of wages, land,
and buildings. We do this by adjusting the reported average costs per patient using a government-
produced market forces factor (MFF) designed for this purpose (Monitor 2013). The MFF, given
by mth, is a scalar unique to each hospital trust h in each year t that is used to weight its costs
based on the level of unavoidable spending faced relative to other trusts. Specifically, the regionally
adjusted cost for a patient of admission category p∈ {El,Em} assigned to HRG code c in hospital
trust h and year t is equal to costthcp =
cost′thcp
mth
, where cost′thcp are the costs reported in the data.
Case-mix Adjustment. As explained earlier in this section, we aggregate data from the HRG
level to the specialty level (HRG chapter). Differences in the average regionally adjusted cost per
specialty patient between two hospitals could therefore be due to a different HRG case-mix within
the specialty. Take, for example, a specialty with two HRGs X and Y and suppose costs of HRG X
are lower than those of HRG Y, independently of the hospital that treats these patients. If Hospital
A has 30% of its specialty patients in HRG X and 70% in Y, while Hospital B has 10% in X and
90% in Y, then this case-mix difference will cause Hospital A’s average cost per patient in the
specialty to be lower than Hospital B’s, simply because it treats relatively more patients in the
cheaper HRG X. To adjust for this case-mix effect, we do not calculate a hospital’s average cost
per specialty patient based on the individual hospital’s relative volumes of HRGs in the specialty
(i.e. 30%CostXA + 70%CostYA for Hospital A and 10%CostXB + 90%CostYB for Hospital B) but
4 Note that an alternative to adjusting the dependent variable is to include regional factors and case-mix as control
variables in the econometric analysis. Findings are consistent and coefficients nearly identical using this approach.
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instead fix the same relative volumes accross all hospitals (e.g. choose relative volumes, say 20%
and 80%, and calculate the costs of a specialty patient as 20%CostXA + 80%CostYA for Hospital
A and 20%CostXB + 80%CostYB for Hospital B). This amounts to projecting the average cost per
specialty patient in the hospital, conditional on the same fixed case-mix for all hospitals. We choose
this fixed case-mix based on the set of 116 reference trusts, Tr, (74% of all trusts in the data) that
we observe throughout the entire observation period and that have not been involved in a hospital
merger. We aggregate their HRG volumes, and calculate the relative volumes of individual HRGs
in a specialty in this aggregated reference trust. We perform this case-mix adjustment separately
for each observation year and admission category and adjust LOS analogously.
Formally, let Ctp be the set of HRGs c in specialty C observed in year t for patients of admission
category p∈ {El,Em}. Then the weight (i.e. relative volume) assigned to a particular HRG c∈Ctp
is equal to αtcp =
ntcp∑
c∈Ctp ntcp
, where ntcp is the total number of patients across all reference trusts
h∈ Tr of admission category p with HRG c in year t. Then hospital trust h’s average cost, CostthCp,
for patients of admission category p in specialty C and year t is calculated as
CostthCp =
∑
c∈Cthp
αtcpcostthcp , (3)
where Cthp ⊆ Ctp is the subset of HRGs c in specialty C for patients of admission category p
that are observed in trust h in year t. We perform a similar weighting procedure to calculate the
case-mix-adjusted average LOS.
Cost Standardization. After case-mix adjusting, costs within a specialty in a given year can
be compared across hospitals. However, costs may still vary across specialties (e.g. between cardiac
conditions and conditions related to the eyes) and over time (due e.g. to macroeconomic factors,
such as inflation, or changes in guidance or regulation that are common to all hospital trusts and
that may render specific specialties more (or less) costly). We could account for this by including e.g.
specialty and year fixed effects in the econometric models, which would act to de-mean the case-mix
adjusted average costs. However, if the variance of costs differs across one or more of the three levels
of our panel then the errors (residuals) will be heteroskedastic even after de-meaning – a violation
of the IID assumption. The left-hand column of Figure 1 shows that heteroskedasticity of costs
across specialties exists even after de-meaning. To reduce heteroskedasticity, we divide CostthCp
with the corresponding case-mix adjusted expected cost, calculated from a set of comparator trusts.
The comparator trusts, Th, for each hospital trust h is the set of 116 reference trusts described
earlier, excluding hospital h if h ∈ Tr (to ensure that the relationship between costs and expected
costs is not endogenous), i.e. Th = Tr \ {h}.
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Formally, we define the expected cost of an HRG c to be equal to
costthcp =
∑
h∈Th nthcpcostthcp∑
h∈Th nthcp
, (4)
where nthcp is the number of patients of admission category p ∈ {El,Em} assigned to HRG code
c in hospital trust h and year t. The expected cost of treating an average patient from specialty
C at hospital h is then be calculated by replacing costthcp in Equation (3) with costthcp, giving
CostthCp. Taking the ratio of CostthCp to CostthCp gives the case-mix adjusted and normalized
costs. A similar adjustment is made for LOS.
To see how this works, suppose that inflation causes costs to increase by 3% in all hospitals.
Then expected costs would then also increase by 3%, and so taking the ratio would remove the
inflationary effect. Further, if costs are, say, 20% higher in specialty A than in specialty B, then the
expected costs will also be 20% higher in specialty A. As a further advantage, observe that there
is no guarantee that a hospital trust will see patients from every HRG c from specialty C in every
financial year. This means that while
∑
c∈Ctp αtcp = 1, it might be the case that
∑
c∈Cthp αtcp < 1,
since one or more c ∈ Ctp may not be in Cthp. In Equation (3) this would have the effect of
reducing CostthCp, artificially deflating our cost measure and making across-hospital comparisons
problematic. Notice, though, that CostthCp will also be reduced, since it is calculated over the
same set of HRGs c ∈Cthp as is CostthCp. As a result, taking the cost to expected cost ratio will
adjust for any unobserved HRGs and so ensures that costs remain comparable across hospitals
(effectively by assuming that those unobserved HRGs would have been above or below expected
cost to the same extent as all of the HRGs that are observed).
In summary, differentiating between elective and emergency admissions, we obtain the four
dependent variables: CostEl and CostEm, the regionally, case-mix-, and standardized average
costs per elective and emergency patient, respectively, and LOSEl and LOSEm, the average
case-mix- and standardized LOS for elective and emergency patients, respectively. An example
demonstrating further the construction of the dependent variables can be found in §EC.9 of the
online supplement. The distribution of the cost variables for each specialty (and the distribution
of their logarithm) are shown in the middle (right) column of Figure 1. Any differences in costs or
LOS between hospital trusts and specialties that are not accounted for by this adjustment method
will be captured through the control structure of the econometric models.
4.2. Independent Variables
To investigate economies of scale and scope we use four measures of volume: the volume of (i)
elective, nElS, and (ii) emergency, nEmS, activity within a specialty (the focal specialty) and the
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Figure 1 Distribution of cost by specialty: De-meaned average costs by specialty (left), average cost ratios
(middle) and the natural logarithm of the ratios (right), for elective (top) and emergency (bottom) admissions.
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volume of (iii) elective, nElH, and (iv) emergency, nEmH, activity from all specialties other than
the focal specialty. Volume refers to the total number of patient admissions per annum. Throughout,
we log transform all volume measures by taking the natural logarithm to reduce heterogeneity
across specialties, skewness, and the influence of outliers.
4.3. Econometric Specification
To simplify the hierarchical structure of the data we present the main analysis using two distinct
panels: one for emergency and one for elective patients.5 Each observation within a panel belongs
to three (non-nested) levels: specialty, hospital trust, year. In this section, we present the models
for the costs of elective patients; the equivalent models for emergency costs or for LOS can be
formulated by replacing the dependent variables accordingly.
The econometric analysis deploys the Mundlak (1978) within–between formulation in the mul-
tilevel modeling (MLM) literature (Certo et al. 2017). Although within–between MLMs are fre-
quently used in other fields, they are less common in the operations management literature despite
their numerous advantages (Bell and Jones 2015). Estimating a within-between MLM requires
that the continuous covariates are decomposed into (1) the cross-sectional (i.e. between-hospital)
variation, and (2) the longitudinal (i.e. within-hospital) variation. The measures of cross-sectional
volume variation captures differences in the aggregate sizes of the specialties at the different hos-
pitals. These are given by calculating the average of each of the four volume measures for each
5 We can combine the two panels and estimate the results jointly, which results in quantitatively and qualitatively
similar findings – see §EC.8 of the online supplement for details.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation table
Descriptive statistics Correlation table
Variable Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Elect. cost / exp. cost CostEl 1.05 0.51 0.11 54.40 0.13∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.00
(2) Emerg. cost / exp. cost CostEm 1.02 0.24 0.07 5.67 0.07∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(3) Elect. LOS / exp. LOS LOSEl 1.04 0.21 0.42 12.98 0.16∗∗∗
(4) Emerg. LOS / exp. LOS LOSEm 1.03 0.18 0.12 4.77
Variable Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(5) LT ln(elect. service vol.) nElSLT -0.00 0.30 -4.00 3.28 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.00 0.17∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(6) LT ln(emerg. service vol.) nEmSLT 0.00 0.23 -2.04 1.93 −0.00 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(7) LT ln(elect. hospital vol.) nElHLT 0.00 0.11 -0.83 0.62 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(8) LT ln(emerg. hospital vol.) nEmHLT -0.00 0.17 -1.16 0.81 −0.01 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
Variable Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(9) CS ln(elect. service vol.) nElSCS 6.76 2.23 0.00 10.24 0.00 0.07∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(10) CS ln(emerg. service vol.) nEmSCS 7.37 1.26 2.63 10.10 −0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(11) CS ln(elect. hospital vol.) nElHCS 10.39 0.50 8.68 11.61 0.04∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(12) CS ln(emerg. hospital vol.) nEmHCS 10.53 0.45 9.05 11.74 0.03∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 −0.10∗∗∗
Notes: LT denotes the longitudinal volume effects; CS denotes the cross-sectional volume effects; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
hospital–admission-type–specialty over the observation period. For example, if nElSthC gives the
number of elective patients in specialty C in hospital trust h in year t, then the corresponding cross-
sectional volume after taking the natural logarithm is given by nElSCShC =
∑
t
ln(nElSthC)
nh
, where nh
is the number of years that hospital trust h is observed in the data set. Using this approach we
generate the four cross-sectional volume measures, nElSCS, nEmSCS, nElHCS and nEmHCS.
The measures of longitudinal volume variation, on the other hand, capture the effect of a (usually
small) change in volume within the same hospital over time. These are calculated by subtract-
ing the cross-sectional volume from the natural logarithm of the raw volume observed in a given
year, e.g. nElSLTthC = ln(nElSthC)−nElSCShC , giving the four longitudinal volume measures nElSLT ,
nEmSLT , nElHLT and nEmHLT . Summary statistics for costs, LOS, and cross-sectional and
longitudinal specialty and hospital volume for both the elective and emergency patient segments
appear in Table 1.
These two types of volume measure different effects. The cross-sectional volumes capture the
approximate scale of the focal and non-focal specialties at each hospital, as well as how this is
split between elective and emergency activity. This is likely to capture systematic differences across
hospitals that are associated with volume (e.g., different asset configuration, optimized patient
pathways, managerial focus, etc.) that drive volume spillover effects. The longitudinal volume
measures allow us to identify how costs respond to the small and gradual changes in the volume of
patients treated at the same hospital–specialty at different points in time, assuming capacity to be
fixed.6 This measure addresses the question: how sensitive are costs to small perturbations in the
6 We show that the assumption of fixed capacity can be relaxed in our robustness tests in §EC.7.5 of the online
supplement, but note also that the asset configuration of UK hospitals is likely to have remained relatively stable
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volume of patients that they treat over time? (Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1, the cross-sectional
variability of volume, as measured by the standard deviation, is 2.6–7.4 higher than the longitudinal
variability.) In other words, one can think of the cross-sectional effect as the hospital design effect
(controlling for variation in utilization over time), while the longitudinal effect captures the asset
utilization effect (controlling for hospital “design”). It is the former that captures the main scale
and scope effects of interest in this study, while the latter serves to measure and control for how
costs respond to changes in asset utilization at different points in time. For more on the distinction
between these two types of effect and discussion of why the cross-section effect is more relevant to
our study see §EC.10 of the online supplement. Our econometric approach will therefore focus on
how to identify the impact of the four cross-sectional (between-hospital) volume measures on cost.
More specifically, the econometric model we estimate takes the following form:
ln(CostEli) = α(thC)[i] +β
LT
1 nElH
LT
i +β
LT
2 nElS
LT
i +β
LT
3 nEmH
LT
i +β
LT
4 nEmS
LT
i
+βCS1 nElH
CS
i +β
CS
2 nElS
CS
i +β
CS
3 nEmH
CS
i +β
CS
4 nEmS
CS
i + i , (5)
where the (random) intercept is given by
α(thC)[i] = bX +β
tP(t)[i] +β
CP(C)[i] +α(h)[i] +α(th)[i] +α(tC)[i] +α(hC)[i] . (6)
Using the notation recommended in Gelman and Hill (2007), the index (thC)[i] denotes the time,
t, hospital trust, h, and specialty, C, corresponding to observation i, and i ∼ N (0, σ2) is the
idiosyncratic error term. The variables Pt and PC are time and specialty FEs, respectively and the
vector X represents controls which we will discuss in §4.4 below.
We make two observations. First, the specification of the random intercept, α(thC)[i], makes
this model more flexible than traditional fixed-effect (FE) regression techniques. The terms α(x)[i],
where (x)[i] takes values (h)[i], (th)[i], (tC)[i], and (hC)[i], denote the hospital trust, trust–year,
specialty–year and specialty–trust random effects (REs), respectively, which are all assumed to be
Normal random variables with a mean of zero and standard deviation to be estimated.7 Second,
formulating the model as a within-between MLM as opposed to a simple RE overcomes one of
the main drawbacks of the RE model: the assumption that random intercepts are not correlated
during the observation period: In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the national government decided
essentially to freeze the NHS budget in real terms, despite continuously increasing demand pressure (NAO 2011,
HMT 2015, NT 2016), making it difficult for hospitals to find the capital to invest in significant changes to asset
structures.
7 We could also have estimated the time and specialty FEs as REs in Equation (6), since the number of categories
(10 years and 14 specialties) and large amount of data per category makes the RE estimation qualitatively similar to
that for FE (Gelman and Hill 2007). The results are indeed similar if we estimate these as REs instead.
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with the independent variables (e.g. the volume). If this assumption is violated (e.g. if there are
unobservable factors such as “management quality” that make a hospital more likely to have
both high cost realization and high volume), then the estimated coefficients would suffer from
heterogeneity bias and the errors would be unreliable (Hsiao 2015). The MLM model offers an
elegant solution to this problem by including the average of the dependent variables explicitly in
the model (Mundlak 1978). Furthermore, this formulation also has a number of other advantages,
including the fact that correct standard errors are automatically estimated without resorting to
error clustering (Bell and Jones 2015), and that this model allows us to also add higher-level
variables (i.e. variables that would have otherwise been collinear with fixed effects in FE models)
as controls. This can help to reduce the (unexplained) variability in the random error. In the next
section we introduce a number of such controls.
4.4. Controls
There are various factors that confound the effect of volume on costs. By exploiting the panel
structure and through the inclusion of the fixed- and random-effects, the multilevel control struc-
ture adjusts for many of these. For example, factors specific to a hospital or a specific specialty
within a hospital (e.g. local competition, complexity of the patient pool, patient demographic and
socioeconomic status) or those specific to a hospital but that might change over time (e.g. man-
agement, facilities and equipment) are already accounted for. However, where possible, we identify
additional controls to include in our models and discuss them below.
Some hospitals may elect to provide a full range of services within a particular specialty, while
others may choose to concentrate on treating particular conditions. Since this may affect the
cost structure, we include four controls (two for electives, two for emergencies) that measure the
range of conditions treated and the degree of concentration. The first two controls measure the
proportion of elective (emergency) services offered within the focal specialty in a given hospital
in a particular year. This is calculated by summing over the weights αtcp defined in §4.1, and is
equal to PropthCp =
∑
c∈Cthp αtcp ≤ 1. When PropthCp = 1 then the hospital provides treatment
across the full range of conditions, and the closer to 0 the more narrow the range of conditions
within a specialty that a hospital offers. The second two controls capture the extent to which a
hospital’s elective (emergency) activity within a specialty is concentrated within a small (or spread
across a large) number of HRGs. This concentration measure is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index. Specifically, if athcp is the proportion of elective (emergency) activity concentrated in HRG
c within specialty C at trust h in year t, then ConcthCp =
∑
c∈Cthp a
2
thcp is a measure of the overall
concentration of activity within specialty C. Both of these controls are interacted with the specialty
fixed effect, PC , to capture possible heterogeneous effects across specialties.
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One point made by extant literature is that a change in volume in one dimension with volume
held constant in all other dimensions will also change the “focus” of the hospital (e.g. McDermott
et al. 2011). So as not to confound the effect of volume spillovers with that of focus, we introduce
another two variables (one for electives, one for emergencies) based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index. These variables serve to capture the degree to which hospitals are differentiated in terms of
their service mix across specialties. This is equal to the sum of squared shares (hospital-specific,
not across all hospitals) of elective (emergency) volume for each of the specialties, and is given by
Concthp. This is a measure of service concentration across all specialties, and specifies the extent
to which the hospital focuses on particular specialties or is more balanced across specialties.
We also include controls for the inpatient activities excluded from our analysis relating to (i)
the five HRG chapters that we drop – see Footnote 3 – and (ii) obstetric services. There are two
options for this. First, we could control for the percentage of total volume that the excluded activity
constitutes at a hospital trust t in a particular year t with VolDroppedth and VolObstetricsth
for the 5 dropped HRG chapters and obstetric services, respectively. Else, we could control for
the percentage of total cost that the excluded activity constitutes with CostDroppedth and
CostObstetricsth. The results are consistent using either approach, with the results in this paper
reported when using the volume controls.
We also note that some trusts operate multiple hospitals, meaning that activity may be dis-
tributed across multiple sites which can make measuring the scale and scope effects of interest
challenging. To adjust for this, we include two further controls in the models. The first, Sitesth, is
a categorical variable equal to the number of acute and multi-service hospital sites that each trust
operates in a particular year. The second, BedConcth, is a control for the concentration of beds
across the different hospital sites that each trust operates. This concentration measure is again
based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. In particular, if btsh is the proportion of total beds at
hospital site s of trust h in year t, then the bed concentration at trust h is equal to
∑
s b
2
tsh.
Finally, we have included three other variables in the model: Teachth, which is a binary variable
taking the value 1 if the hospital trust has teaching status and 0 otherwise, Mergerth, which is a
binary variable taking value 1 when the hospital trust was involved in a merger the previous year
and 0 otherwise, and Regionh, which indicates which of the 10 UK regions (so-called “strategic
health authorities”) the hospital belongs to.
To remain consistent with the MLM approach, all of the continuous controls (i.e. those that are
not binary or categorical) are separated into their longitudinal (within-hospital) and cross-sectional
(between-hospital) parts.
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5. Discussion of Results
The within–between RE (MLM) regression models were estimated in R (version 3.3.3) using the
lmer() function of the lme4 package, with model parameters calculated using restricted maximum
likelihood estimation (Bates et al. 2015). Recall that the unit of analysis for each regression model
is a specialty in a hospital trust within a fixed admission category (elective or emergency), observed
annually over a 10-year period.
Table 2 contains the most relevant regression output for costs and length of stay (LOS), sep-
arately for the two admission categories. The upper two panels report coefficient estimates and
standard errors of the longitudinal and cross-sectional effects, respectively, for the four independent
variables of interest. These coefficients capture direct economies of scale (the effect of increased
volume in the focal specialty and focal admission category) and three spillover effects: (i) the effect
of increased volume in other specialties in the focal admission category; (ii) the effect of increased
volume in the other admission category in the focal specialty; (iii) the effect of increased volume in
other specialties in the other admission category. The third panel (“Control structure”) reports the
factors that are included as fixed effects (FE) – indicated by a “Y” – and gives the estimated stan-
dard deviations of the factors that are modelled as random effects (RE). The lower panel (“Model
fit”) reports the marginal R2, which describes the proportion of variance explained by non-random
factors (e.g. the volume variables and controls) alone, and the conditional R2, which describes the
proportion of variance explained by both the non-random and random factors (Johnson 2014).
Before we discuss the results, we remind the reader that the cross-sectional effect coefficients refer
to the effect of variation in time-averaged patient volumes between hospitals, while the longitudinal
coefficients capture the effects of annual changes in patient volumes, above and beyond aggregate
demand growth, which is controlled through year-fixed effects. The cross-sectional effects are there-
fore likely to capture cost-effects resulting from systematic volume-driven differences (e.g., different
asset configuration, optimized patient pathways, managerial focus, etc.), the hospital design effect,
while the longitudinal effects capture cost-effects of changes in asset utilization, in response to
changing volume over time. Our focus is on the former effect, while controlling for the latter.
Since the dependent and independent variables have been log-transformed, their coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities, i.e., the coefficient is the percentage change in Cost (or LOS)
associated with a 100% increase (i.e. doubling) of the respective annual volumes. Note that, as
a consequence, the magnitude of a reported coefficient of the volume of the focal specialty (e.g.
Elect. vol. (focal Sp)) is not directly comparable with the corresponding coefficient of the volume
of other specialties (e.g. Elect. vol. (other Sps)) because the total volume of all other specialties
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Table 2 Model parameter estimates – MLMs using within-between volume decomposition
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.131∗∗∗ 0.007† −0.074∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.127∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ −0.028∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.014) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.003 −0.177∗∗∗ 0.012∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.036 −0.181∗∗∗ 0.025† −0.110∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.014) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.048∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.048 0.137∗∗∗ 0.013 0.054∗
(0.039) (0.030) (0.016) (0.026)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.012 −0.144∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.106∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.051 −0.110∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.032
(0.038) (0.030) (0.015) (0.026)
Control structure
Year Y Y Y Y
Specialty Y Y Y Y
Trust 0.080 0.072 0.030 0.065
Trust–year 0.084 0.091 0.042 0.093
Specialty–trust 0.147 0.088 0.058 0.066
Specialty–year 0.025 0.014 0.020 0.015
Residual std. error 0.209 0.140 0.105 0.092
Model fit
Observations 20,057 21,507 20,057 21,507
Marginal R2 0.127 0.215 0.144 0.152
Conditional R2 0.519 0.626 0.458 0.724
Bayesian inf. crit. 1,758.5 -14,796.5 -26,284.0 -31,153.2
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; Inclusion of a FE in the control structure indicated
by a “Y”, inclusion of a RE indicated by the reporting of its estimated standard deviation.
combined will be much larger than that of the single focal specialty. Hence a 100% increase of the
former implies a much larger absolute increase than a 100% increase of the latter. To help the
reader compare the coefficients, we calculate the effect of an increase by 1,000 patients per annum
at the mean (as given in Table 1) and we report this in the final column (Column 4) of Table
3 which summarizes the estimated effects. We do so only for the more important cross-sectional
effects of volume.
5.1. Economies of Scale and Spillover Effects for Elective Services
Starting from economies of scale within elective services (first column of Table 2), after control-
ling for asset utilization, we find that elective specialties structured to treat a higher volume of
patients (the cross-sectional effect of volume) are associated with lower costs. More specifically
a 10% increase in the average volume of elective patients within a specialty leads to a 0.48%
(p < 0.1%) reduction of cost per patient. In absolute terms, the marginal impact of increasing the
average number of elective patients treated by a specialty by 1,000 per annum on the cost per
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patient is −3.7%. Turning to spillover effects from other elective specializations, after controlling for
asset utilization, we find that the average volume of other elective specializations (cross-sectional
volume effect) has no statistically significant effect on costs (β = 0.048, p= 22.8%). Similarly, we
find no volume-related spillover effect on elective costs from emergency patients either within the
same medical specialization (β =−0.012, p= 52.8%) or from different medical specializations and
(β =−0.051, p= 17.2%). These results are confirmed by the LOS regression in the third column
of Table 2. In summary, the results of the cross-sectional differences in volume across hospital–
specialties suggest that there exist economies of scale for elective care; services designed to treat a
larger volume of elective patients generate costs savings. However, we find no evidence to suggest
that the organizational integration of multiple specialty services, or the organizational integration
of emergency and elective services, provide productivity benefits for elective services.
Turning to the longitudinal effects, which capture the impact of differential asset utilization
within specialty, we find that elective costs are reduced as the annual volume of elective patients
within the specialty increases (β =−0.131, p < 0.1%) and as the annual volume of elective patients
from other specialties increases (β = −0.127, p < 0.1%)8 but we find no statistically significant
effects on costs from emergency patients volumes, either within (β = 0.003, p= 78.3%) or between
different specialties (β = 0.036, p= 19.4%). The results on the impact of volume on LOS are similar
both in direction and magnitude (with the only difference that some of the small coefficients that
were not statistically significant at conventional levels for costs are marginally significant for LOS).
The longitudinal results are consistent with the view that higher elective volume leads to higher
utilization of assets designed for elective care which leads to a reduction of costs, but suggest that
an increased volume of emergency patients confers no additional benefit. The latter is consistent
with the observation that emergency patients have sufficiently differentiated medical needs from
elective patients.
5.2. Economies of Scale and Spillover Effects for Emergency Services
Analogously to elective services, we find strong economies of scale in emergency services (second
column of Table 2). After controlling for asset utilization, we find that a 10% increase in the average
volume of emergency patients treated by a specialty reduces costs by 1.44% (p < 0.1%). In addition
to the positive economies of scale associated with an increase in the volume of emergency patients
within a specialty, for emergency patients we also find a positive spillover effect associated with
8 We remind the reader that even though the magnitude of these coefficients are comparable, the marginal effect of an
additional patient within a specialty (the first effect) is much larger than the marginal effect of an additional patient
from a different specialty (the second effect). As explained above, this is due to the fact these coefficients represent
elasticities.
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Table 3 Marginal effects at the mean
Approximate marginal
effect size on costs(1)Effect on. . . of an increase in. . . from the. . .
Elective
productivity

Elective vol.
{
Focal Sp −3.7%
Other Sps –
Emergency vol.
{
Focal Sp –
Other Sps –
Emergency
productivity

Elective vol.
{
Focal Sp +2.4%
Other Sps +0.4%
Emergency vol.
{
Focal Sp −7.1%
Other Sps −0.3%
(1)Effect on costs is approximated by adding 1,000 patients per annum (from the specialty(s) and
admission category in the corresponding row) to the mean volume level given in Table 1. The effect
is based on the cross-sectional-volume effects estimated in Table 2.
an increase in emergency volumes from other services. More specifically, after controlling for asset
utilization, we find that a 10% increase in time-averaged emergency volume in other specialties
to be associated with a 1.10% cost reduction. To help the reader compare the magnitude of these
estimated effects, we note that the marginal impact of increasing the average number of emergency
patients treated by the focal specialty (by other specialties) by 1,000 per annum on the cost per
patient is −7.1% (−0.3%). The positive spillover from one medical specialty to another, present
for emergency patients but not for electives, is consistent with the fact that emergency patients
share more assets/resources across specialties than elective patients (see §7.1 for more discussion
on this point).
In sharp contrast to elective services, the results suggest that there exists negative spillover effects
from elective to emergency services. After controlling for asset utilization, we find that the cost
of emergency patients increases when they are treated in hospitals designed to cater for a larger
volume of elective patients. More specifically, after controlling for asset utilization, a 10% increase
in the elective patient volume of the focal specialty (other specialties) is associated with an increase
in emergency costs by 0.31%, p < 0.1% (1.37%, p < 0.1%) in the focal specialty. The associated
marginal effect of increasing the average number of elective patient volume of the focal specialty
(other specialties) by 1,000 per annum on the emergency costs of the focal specialty is 2.4% (0.4%).
Turning to the longitudinal effects, which capture the impact of differential asset utilization
within a specialty, we find that the cost of treating emergency patients is reduced as the annual
volume of emergency patients within the specialty increases (β = −0.177, p < 0.1%) and as the
annual volume of emergency patients from other specialties increases (β =−0.181, p < 0.1%). In
addition, we find some evidence that an increase in annual volume of elective patients either within
26 Freeman, Savva, Scholtes: Economies of Scale and Scope in Hospitals
(β = 0.007, p = 9.57%) or across specialties (β = 0.083, p = 0.13%). Together, the longitudinal
effects are consistent with the more important cross-sectional effects.
As in the case of elective services, the results from the LOS regressions are similar in both
direction and magnitude and confirm both the positive economies of scale as well as the negative
spillovers from elective to emergency services (see the fourth column of Table 2).
6. Limitations, Robustness Tests, and Alternative Specifications
As with all “multi-firm” studies based on accounting costs, our analysis has limitations due to
the unobserved degree of adherence of individual hospital cost accounting systems to the national
guidelines. We believe that the aggregation of the granular HRG codes to which costs are allocated
to the coarser level of HRG chapters as the unit of analysis helps alleviate this problem as accounting
inaccuracies within specialties average out at the aggregate level and accounting misallocations
between specialties are less likely. In addition, we corroborate our findings with an analysis of LOS,
which is unaffected by hospital accounting systems but highly correlated with costs, and which
confirms our results.
Nevertheless, to investigate the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we
extend the empirical model to allow the volume effects to vary by specialty, discuss potential reverse
causality, and describe the findings from a number of other model specifications. More details on
these additional analyses are presented in the online supplement. Throughout these sections the
emphasis of the discussion is on the more important cross-sectional volume effects, but we also
note that the results of the longitudinal volume remain similar.
6.1. Heterogeneous Effects Across Specialties
In the models presented in the previous section, we estimated the average impact of volume on costs
and LOS across different specialties, implicitly assuming that this impact of volume was homoge-
neous across the different specialties. We can relax this assumption and allow for heterogeneous
slopes for each of the specialties. To do this we estimate a model where, in addition to random
intercepts, we also allow for random slopes. In essence these random slopes allow specialty specific
deviations from the common “overall” volume effect. This is a more flexible approach than adding
interaction terms between the specialties and volume effects of interest, although the interpretation
is similar. We discuss and present results here for random slope estimates for Elect. vol. (focal Sp)
and Emerg. vol. (focal Sp), with results for volume in other specialties being similar and reported
in §EC.1 in the online supplement. Exact details of how the random slopes are implemented can
also be found in the online supplement.
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Figure 2 Random slope coefficient estimates for the effect of volume in the focal specialty on costs, reported
by specialty (black) and combined (red), with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2 shows the random slope estimates of the between-effects in the cost models, together
with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (using 10,000 simulations from the posterior distri-
bution). The separate slopes that are derived for each specialty give an estimate of the specialty-
specific cross-sectional effects of elective and emergency volume on cost. These can be compared
with the combined slope estimates from §5, which are also plotted (as “ALL”) in Figure 2. Com-
paring these, it can be seen that the directions of the specialty-specific effects are consistent with
the combined estimates, with 95% confidence intervals overlapping in nearly all cases.9 Due to
limited data, the confidence intervals are wide for these specialty-dependent random slopes, and
so in presenting the main results we prefer to report the aggregate effects across specialties.
One limitation of the work presented above is that there may be certain specialties that share
more resources than others. Since our empirical strategy combines all other elective specialties,
our results may underestimate the potential economies of scope that might be achieved through
combining particular elective specialties. We note that this does not invalidate our findings of
economies of scale within a specialty, nor the negative spillover effect from electives to emergencies.
9 Observe that specialty P, corresponding to pediatrics, appears not to follow the general trend. This may not be
too surprising since pediatrics is a highly specialized service for which only a limited number of hospitals provide
treatment across the full spectrum of possible conditions. We note that excluding this specialty from the analysis
does not change the qualitative findings.
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Instead, it suggests that there may be even further cost savings that might be achieved through
being more strategic, e.g., by growing electives of related specialties.
6.2. Reverse Causality
In this paper we have argued that higher volumes confer a productivity advantage. However, the
direction of causality is not apparent: It could be argued instead that the positive relationship
identified between volume and productivity is actually the result of either (i) more cost-effective
hospitals being referred or taking action to attract a higher volume of patients or (ii) patients
self-selecting these hospitals. Here we discuss both of these alternatives and combine empirical
arguments made using the data with other evidence to suggest that this is not the case.
First, we consider whether patients are referred more often to more productive hospitals or
if those hospitals use their stronger financial position to take action (e.g. through marketing or
lobbying) to increase their patient pool. We note that any effect is likely to be small, since a
recent study by the King’s Fund, an independent UK-based healthcare think tank, found that
most hospital trusts operated in a defined geographical market and only competed for patients “at
the boundaries of their catchment areas, where another provider was equidistant” (Dixon et al.
2010). Nevertheless, to test this we run additional analysis where we examine whether past financial
performance is a predictor of future patient volumes. If better performing hospitals are able to
attract or are referred a higher volume of patients, then we would expect lower costs in the past to
be positively correlated with higher patient volume in the future. However, our regression results
(reported in §EC.4.1 of the online supplement) suggest that, if anything, the opposite occurs:
hospitals that are higher cost in the past are more rather than less likely to increase patient volumes
than lower cost hospitals.
Next, we consider whether patients self-select more productive hospitals. We note first that as
health services in the UK are free at the point of care there is little incentive for a patient to
select their care provider based on cost. Indeed, such information is not made readily available.
However, while patients are unlikely to decide based on cost, it is possible that they will select
based on quality. As cost and quality are often correlated, and quality is an unobserved factor that
we do not account for in this analysis, this could be driving the results. Information on the quality
of hospitals, however, has not been readily available until recently, and it remains challenging for
patients to compare treatment for procedures at different hospitals. Patients may infer quality
through other more tacit means, however, e.g. by way of word of mouth. To test this, we utilized
data from a government administered Adult Inpatient Satisfaction Survey (NHS 2017). This annual
survey contains responses to various questions about patients’ experiences at every acute NHS
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trust, and is available over the same 10 year period as the cost data. The responses are aggregated
into an Overall Patient Experience Score which serves as an excellent proxy for perceived quality
and so we would expect to capture much of the word of mouth effect. When introduced into the
MLMs this variable has little to no impact and our main results remain unchanged (see §EC.4.2
of the online supplement). This is consistent with past research that has shown that there is little,
if any, evidence of patients (or their physicians) exercising such choice (e.g. Gaynor et al. 2004,
Gowrisankaran et al. 2006).
We also address the reverse causality concerns by re-running the analysis using a subset of the
data corresponding to those hospital trusts that are geographically more isolated, with a restriction
that the nearest trust can be no closer than 20km away. This has the effect of removing all hospital
trusts located in cities and other more densely populated regions and, thus, reducing the number of
trust-year observations by 64%, from 1,434 to 517. While this does not entirely avoid the problem
of selection, the selection effect should be weaker in this subsample (as it is more inconvenient for a
patient to attend another provider and hospitals have less ability to increase patient intake), espe-
cially for emergency patients, who need to be treated quickly. Therefore, if reverse causality were
driving our results, then we would expect to find weaker evidence of productivity improvements
from pooling similar types of activity when using this sample. The results (available in §EC.4.3 of
the online supplement) show that this is not the case, with coefficient estimates nearly identical in
sign and scale.
Together, this evidence suggests that the effects identified are very unlikely to be the result of
reverse causality.
6.3. Other Robustness Checks and Modeling Alternatives
Another plausible type of endogeneity is selection by hospitals: Certain hospitals may choose to offer
a subset of elective and/or emergency services (i.e. treat patients with a subset of conditions/HRGs
only), and the choice of which services they offer may well depend on the profitability of these
services. We have already partially accounted for this in our models by controlling for hospital–
specialty effects as well as for the proportion of services, PropthCp, offered by a hospital within each
specialty in each year. Nevertheless, if specialties were formed endogenously in the way described
above, then we might expect hospitals that offer fewer services also to be more profitable. In §EC.5
of the online supplement we show that there is little evidence of endogenous selection for emergency
patients. For elective patients, we find that those hospitals that operate at higher volumes are less,
not more, selective and offer a greater variety of services. If endogenous specialty formation were
driving our results, we would, therefore, expect to find effects in the opposite direction to those we
observe.
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One concern when working with panel data is that errors may be autocorrelated, leading to
underestimation of the standard errors of the estimated coefficients when autocorrelation is positive
and potentially biasing the estimated coefficients in the within–between formulation (Hsiao 2015).
We perform formal hypothesis testing with the Baltagi–Wu LBI test statistic and also extend our
MLMs to allow the error term to be first-order autoregressive, i.e. to have AR(1) disturbances.
Although, unsurprisingly, there exists some evidence of autocorrelation, the results remain consis-
tent in terms of sign, scale and significance when we adjust our models to account for this effect
(refer to §EC.2 of the online supplement for further details).
One might also be concerned about the high correlation between the various cross-sectional vol-
ume measures. To explore this further, we re-ran analysis but dropped each volume measure from
the model one-at-a-time. Note that this approach has limitations since we trade-off multicollinear-
ity concerns with a potential omitted variable bias that may arise from dropping a significant
explanatory variable. These models show all of the findings to hold, except for the effect of emer-
gency volume from other specialties on emergency costs in the focal specialty. Further testing for
evidence for multicollinearity suggests this is not a major concern, i.e. all generalized VIFs take
value less than 5.
Another possibility we consider in §EC.3 of the online supplement is that there may be non-linear
effects of volume on costs. Although the models we estimate are already non-linear (as they involve
the logarithmic transformations of both the dependent and independent variables) and suggest
diminishing returns to scale (as the estimated coefficients are all < 1 and >−1), we also estimate
models in which we add a squared-volume term for each of the cross-sectional effects. We find no
evidence of any additional non-linear effect (reported in §EC.3 of the online supplement).
While we combine day cases and elective inpatients in the data, it is also possible to separate
them into distinct admission categories and examine the scale and spillover effects at this level.
One issue, as we explain in §EC.6 of the online supplement, is that hospitals may be able to choose
whether to treat a particular patient as a day case or an overnight elective inpatient. Consequently,
a hospital may have a high volume of elective inpatients due to one of two factors: (1) they operate
at higher volume, or (2) they have been relatively less successful than their peers in transitioning
inpatients to day cases. While we hypothesize that the former should lead to a reduction in costs
through economies of scale, the latter would bias costs upwards in the opposite direction, since
day cases are relatively cheaper. In fact, this upwards bias is exactly what we find in the online
supplement when we estimate such a model. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that the volume of
day cases has a spillover effect onto the cost of elective inpatients or emergency cases, and the
results reported in §5 of this paper are otherwise unaffected.
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In addition to the models discussed above, we estimate a number of alternative model specifi-
cations that (i) cap costs at the HRG level to reduce the influence of outliers, capping below at
1/5th and above at 5 times the system-wide median, (ii) only compare costs for a subset of HRGs
for which treatment in each year is provided in at least 80% of the hospital trusts in the sample,
and (iii) constrain the sample to only include those specialty–trusts with a minimum volume level
(e.g. >25% of the system-wide median) in order to reduce the potential influence of outliers. Since
some trusts operate multiple hospital sites (with typically one large, main hospital and one or more
smaller hospital sites), we also repeat the analysis for the subset of trusts with a single hospital
site. Finally, we examine whether there is evidence of asset changes over time in hospitals by re-
running the analysis allowing for one major structural change midway though the sample period
per hospital trust. The results of these estimations are reported in §EC.7 of the online supplement
and are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in §5 of this paper.
7. Discussion and Implications for Practice
From a productivity perspective, the prevailing model of the fully comprehensive general hospi-
tal is predicated on the assumption that there are economies of scale and scope that come from
pooling planned (elective) and unplanned (emergency) patient services and from pooling different
specialties. Our findings cast doubts on this premise and, therefore, provide cause to rethink indi-
vidual hospital growth strategies and the configuration of hospital systems at the regional level.
We explore these two themes further in this section through counterfactual analyses. Before doing
so we offer a discussion on the plausible mechanisms driving the results.
7.1. Mechanisms
First, the results presented in §5 confirm previous findings that there exist strong economies of
scale within specialties (Carey et al. 2015, Gaynor et al. 2015), though our analysis is more granular
and confirms that the scale effect also exists when the volume within a specialty is separated into
elective versus emergency activity. This reflects the well-understood opportunities that scale allows
for spreading of fixed costs, learning and innovation, and new and better utilization of capacity.
Furthermore, that the impact of scale is approximately two times larger for emergencies than for
electives is consistent with the observation that emergencies also stand to benefit from statistical
economies of scale. Specifically, the relative variability of emergency patient arrivals is reduced as
their volume increases (Dijk and Sluis 2004), and thus the amount of slack capacity that a hospital
needs to hold is also reduced. Elective arrivals, which are predictable and can be scheduled in
advance, do not benefit as much from such statistical economies of scale.
32 Freeman, Savva, Scholtes: Economies of Scale and Scope in Hospitals
Second, while we find no evidence for spillover effects on elective patients from an increase in
the volume of electives from other specialties, we do find a positive spillover effect on emergency
patients from an increase in the volume of emergency patients of other specialties (a 10% increase
in emergency volume in other specialties results in a decrease in emergency costs in the focal
specialty by 1.10%, on average). As highlighted in §3.3, this may be due to the differences in the
nature of elective and emergency care; the former more well-defined while the latter more poorly
specified on arrival. This allows elective care to be delivered in different specialty units that operate
independently of one another, while emergencies benefit from effective coordination and knowledge
exchange between different specialties. Hospital statistics point in this direction too: on average,
elective patients spent time under the care of 1.01 consultants (i.e. senior physicians) per spell
during their hospital stay versus 1.32 for emergencies (DH 2015).10 This is consistent with other
data showing that emergency patients are more likely to be medical (as opposed to surgical) and
tend to be older and more complex, with more diseases and health conditions (Dawson et al. 2008).
This suggests that opportunities for both tangible (e.g., sharing physicians across specialties) and
intangible (e.g., applying learning and experience acquired from treating one specialty to another)
interrelations across different specialties are stronger for emergency than for elective care.
Third, while we find no evidence of a spillover effect on electives from an increase in volume
of emergencies, we do see evidence of a negative spillover on emergencies from an increase in the
volume of electives (a 10% increase in elective patients within a specialty (in all other specialties,
resp.) increases the cost of emergency care by 0.31% (1.37%, resp.)). In contrast to the previous
two findings, this asymmetric spillover result may appear surprising. However, there is one key
difference between elective and emergency services, besides their planned versus acute natures,
that may help explain these findings: emergency services are in a specific sense “more powerful”
because the acute needs of these patients give them a natural right to disrupt elective services
if and when needed. For example, Dimitriadis et al. (2013) report that in 2012, 5.2% of elective
procedures in English hospitals were canceled on the day of the surgery and Robb et al. (2004)
identified emergency medical admissions as one important factor that explains these cancellations.
When elective volume increases, economies of scale make electives more profitable, and thus
disruptions of these services become more costly for the hospital. Hence, the hospital has a financial
incentive to protect electives more aggressively from emergency interference. This can be done in
many ways, such as ring-fencing beds or theatres (Kjekshus and Hagen 2005, Dimitriadis et al. 2013)
10 In a separate analysis using patient-level data available to this study’s authors (corresponding to 3.4m patient
admissions to 50 trusts in the UK in 2015/16), we find that nearly 15.4% of emergency patients received care across
multiple specialties, as compared to just 0.6% of elective patients.
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or replacing shared resources by specialized resources that are of less use for emergency services
(e.g. hiring a specialist into a generalist vacancy). This protective dynamic reduces emergency
access to formerly shared resources and necessitates an additional investment in emergency services
to maintain the same level of quality and performance. This makes emergencies more costly. The
implications of ring-fencing elective resources – which the UK healthcare regulator recommends for
orthopedic and cardiothoracic elective surgical services (Wong et al. 2018) – on emergency care is a
topic of active research, not least because of the ethical implications of prioritizing elective patients
over emergencies (Mayer et al. 2008). Our findings are consistent with the view that (volume-
enabled) ring-fencing of elective activity may have a detrimental effect on the productivity of
emergency care. It would be of interest for future research to investigate the impact of ring-fencing
in more detail.
Similar to electives, when emergency volume increases, emergencies can exploit scale economies
and so become more profitable. However, this is also likely to lead to more instances of emergen-
cies disrupting elective services, increasing costs of electives (e.g. through increased idle time of
specialists when operations get canceled) (Ferrand et al. 2014). However, two mechanisms point in
the opposite direction. First, statistical economies of scale stipulate that the increase in emergency
volume makes this activity less variable, which, coupled with good planning, can reduce elective
disruptions. In addition, an increase in emergency volume makes investments in dedicated emer-
gency resources more economical (e.g. emergency theaters or short-stay geriatric wards). This leads
to a decoupling of resources, meaning that electives are less likely to experience disruption, hence
lowering their costs. Our results suggest that the positive and negative effects seem to balance out
as we do not find a significant spillover effect from emergencies to electives in aggregate. To better
understand this spillover phenomenon, future research should use more granular patient-episode
data to determine how these mechanisms interact and which service characteristics moderate the
direction of the spillover effect from emergencies to electives.
7.2. Implications for Hospital Management
Turning to the implications of our findings for hospital management, hospitals considering different
growth strategies have to be aware that while increasing elective activity improves the productivity
of their elective patients, it has a negative impact on emergency activity, not only within the
specialty that is growing but also for emergency patients in other specialties.
To illustrate this, consider the model-predicted effect of different growth strategies for a major
London hospital, St. George’s, which admitted about 117,500 elective and emergency patients in
2015/16 in our dataset at a total cost of ∼ £220m. We estimate the impact of increasing total
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patient admissions to 141,000 per annum as a result of one of three strategies: (i) a 20% expansion
across the board in elective and emergency volume, (ii) a 33% increase in emergency activity only,
or (iii) a 50% increase in elective volume only, where growth causes the volume in each specialty
to increase by the same percentage. Using the modeling results from §5, and focusing on the
cross-sectional effect associated with different asset configurations rather than higher utilization
of existing assets, we estimate that in the first scenario, elective costs would fall by 0.9% and
emergency costs by 1.6%, leading to a total cost saving of £3m per annum. The emergency growth
strategy would not affect elective costs but would reduce emergency costs by 7.3%, leading to a
total cost saving of £11m per annum. Finally, the elective growth strategy would reduce elective
costs by 2.0% but would have the unintended consequence of a 6.7% increase in emergency costs,
leading to a total cost increase of £7m per annum. The negative spillover across all emergency
services quickly erodes the productivity benefits of higher volume in elective services.
This finding is surprising and important: The majority of hospitals in the UK are in deficit in
the 2015/16 financial year and most chief executives see growth in elective activity, which is easier
to plan and has less variation in costs, as the preferred way of increasing productivity to turn
their hospital around. Few hospital managers would consider expanding their emergency activity.
From a cost-management perspective, our results suggest that an elective growth strategy can be
counterproductive if the hospital has high emergency volume, and that in order to reduce costs it
may actually be better to increase emergency activity instead.
7.3. Implications for Regional Policy
Turning to the regional organisation of hospital systems, our results suggest that removing elective
volume from general hospitals and instead treating these patients in regional focused factories
should improve productivity for both the re-routed elective patients and the emergency patients
remaining in the downsized general hospitals. To investigate the possible cost savings at the regional
level, we present the results of a counterfactual analysis based on a plausible re-organization of
elective services in London. We assume that any two hospital trusts in the city might agree to
redistribute their elective services in such a way that there is no duplication of specialties between
the two hospitals. We then estimate the cost implications arising from the increase in elective
volume within each specialty. To minimize the need for additional capacity investment, we match
hospital trusts pairwise based on their size, with the match made by pairing trusts that are most
similar in terms of their total elective volume. Using the new allocation and the cross-sectional
volume effects reported in §5, we calculate that for the trust-years in our analysis the total cost
of providing elective care would be reduced by 3.6% (from £11.22bn to £10.81bn) per annum. If
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Figure 3 Percentage reduction in total cost (with 95% confidence intervals) of elective activity in London
when a percentage of elective activity is reallocated between two trusts.
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instead we only move 10%, 20%, 30% etc. of the activity then lesser gains can be achieved, as
shown in Figure 3. Note that the cost savings could potentially be greater if (i) more than two
hospital trusts worked together and (ii) the reallocation was based not only on volume but also on
costs (so that the increased elective volume would be routed to the cheapest hospital). This finding
implies that even simple regional reorganization may result in substantial cost savings.
Our findings also reconcile two seemingly opposing trends: (1) for small general hospitals to be
closed or downgraded to urgent care centers and activity moved to larger general hospitals in the
proximity and (2) for greater specialization with the opening of specialist hospitals focusing on
only particular types of conditions. Interestingly, we show that these trends may not be at odds
and that the cost of providing care to different types of patients may be reduced through these
different approaches. In particular, the productivity of elective care would benefit if elective patients
were treated in specialist hospitals or regional treatment centers focused on specific specialties.
We estimate, for example, that if London were to operate 14 such focused factories for each of the
14 specialties in our study, then costs could be reduced further to £9.76bn: a saving of 13.6%. In
addition, emergency patients would benefit from being treated in large, general acute hospitals that
focus primarily on emergency care and treat a full spectrum of services. Implementing different
service delivery modes for planned and unplanned activity could, therefore, be a highly effective
way of increasing the productivity (and quality – see e.g. RCS/DH 2007, Kuntz et al. 2018) of
hospital services in the longer term.
7.4. Conclusion
We use a unique longitudinal dataset to contribute new insights as to the degree to which economies
of scale and scope prevail within the hospital industry. While theory and prior empirical work
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offer strong support for scale economies within specialties, which we confirm, there has been little
prior work on the spillover effects of volume increases across admission categories (elective or
emergency) and specialties (e.g. cardiology, urology, etc.). Complementing the results of Gaynor
et al. (2015), who found evidence of diseconomies of scope across specialties for secondary and
tertiary care, we show that distinguishing between planned (elective) and unplanned (emergency)
activity – which until now has been an overlooked source of heterogeneity in the literature – leads
to a more nuanced understanding of the degree to which spillovers exist between specialties within
a hospital. In particular, we find no evidence of spillover effects for elective patients. For emergency
patients, on the other hand, we do find evidence of economies of scope across specialties; however,
the direction of the scope effect depends on whether that activity is attached to patients of the same
admission type (emergency) – in which case there are positive spillovers – or the other admission
type (electives) – in which case there are negative spillovers.11
Our observations have implications for productivity-enhancing growth strategies for hospitals,
especially given the increasing financial strain and demand pressures that hospitals and health
services are facing worldwide, which is challenging hospital managers and governments to consider
new strategies to provide more effective and efficient care. Our work indicates that, from a cost
perspective at least, the current business model of the acute general hospital – which conflates
patients with different service intensities, specialties, and degrees of urgency – may need to be
rethought. Our findings suggest that general hospitals would be more efficient if they focused on
emergency activity, with elective patients being treated instead in high-volume regional focused
factories. From a productivity perspective, this supports the widely discussed redesign paradigm
for regional hospital systems with separate “solutions shop hospitals,” focused on unplanned work
that requires trial and error and decision-making “on the spot,” and “value-adding process clinics”
that provide standardized treatments at high volume (Christensen et al. 2009).
Despite having stress tested these results with a battery of robustness tests, we encourage other
studies conducted in different contexts to further increase confidence in the findings. In partic-
ular, although we have used multiple strategies to alleviate concerns about reverse causality, we
note that we cannot definitively rule out this possibility. Moreover, the high degree of correlation
between elective and emergency patient volume at the hospital level makes estimation of the indi-
vidual effects challenging, and as noted earlier in §6.3, the positive spillover across specialties for
11 In fact, this distinction may explain the different directions of the scope effects observed in the Gaynor et al. (2015)
paper: the authors find evidence of positive economies of scope between specialties in primary care (for which only 10%
of patients were scheduled, allowing for large positive spillovers between unscheduled patients but limited exposure
to negative spillovers from scheduled onto unscheduled patients), but negative economies of scope in secondary and
tertiary care sample (the latter of which had over 40% of patients scheduled).
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emergency activity that we identify appears to be especially sensitive to this. Furthermore, while
the counterfactual analyses suggest large potential productivity gains, there may well be reasons
beyond the scope of this study – such as access to care, patient and physician preferences, hospital
teaching needs – that make such dramatic redesigns practically difficult to implement. We also
acknowledge that this work has not been able to uncover the exact mechanisms that give rise to the
positive and negative spillover effects identified in the paper. Future research, using more detailed
data than currently available, should look to address this.
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e-companion to
“Economies of Scale and Scope in Hospitals”
This e-companion contains supporting material designed to accompany the investigation presented
in the main paper. In Section EC.1 we provide random slope estimates for the effects of volume
from other specialty, to augment those provided for volume of the same specialty given in the
Section 6.1 of the paper. In Section EC.2 we show that there is no evidence that the errors are
autocorrelated. In Section EC.3 we investigate the possibility of non-linear volume effects, and
find little evidence to suggest this is the case. In Section EC.4 we discuss and argue against the
possibility that our findings are due to reverse causality. In Section EC.5 we discuss the fact that
elective specialties might be formed endogeneously based on financial viability, and show how we
account for this, provide additional robustness checks, and discuss how – if anything – this would
be expected to work against our findings. In Section EC.6, we treat elective inpatient and day cases
as separate admission categories, rather than combining them into the same admission category
as in the paper. In Section EC.7 we report on the results a number of additional tests that (i)
are performed on a subset of data corresponding to hospital trusts that are more geographically
isolated, (ii) limit the possibility of extreme cost outliers driving the results, (iii) compare hospital
trusts based on a set of common (rather than all) HRGs that are performed by most (>80%) of
trusts, (iv) re-run the models on a subset of the specialties for which hospital trusts treat a high
enough volume of patients, and (v) restrict the sample to trusts that operate only a single hospital
site. The results from all of the models in Section EC.7 are in line with those reported in the
paper. In Section EC.8 we combine the elective and emergency panels are report results from a
joint analysis which allows for the errors terms across the two patient types to be correlated. In
Section EC.9 we present more details on how we generated the dependent variables used in the
main analysis. In Section EC.10 we provide a discussion on the longitudinal and cross-section effect
of volume. Finally, in Section EC.11, we provide an in-depth literature review.
EC.1. Random slopes – hospital trust volume effects
In Section 6.1 of the paper we report on random slopes estimates for the effect of same–speciality
volume on hospital trust costs. First we must discuss how these effects were estimated, before
extending them to examine whether the spillover effect of volume from the other specialties on cost
of the focal specialty differs by specialty.
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To estimate the random slopes in Section 6.1 of the paper we include in Equation (5) ran-
dom specialty-dependent slopes βLT1,(C)[i], β
LT
2,(C)[i], β
CS
1,(C)[i] and β
CS
2,(C)[i], respectively. These specialty-
dependent random slopes model the degree to which the volume effect for a given specialty deviates
from the global volume effect.
It is typical in the MLM literature to allow the random slopes to be correlated with the specialty-
specific intercepts. To achieve this we need to also replace the specialty FE, P(C)[i], in Equa-
tion (6) – which we use in place of a RE (see footnote 7) – with a RE, α(C)[i]. We then model
(α(C)[i], β
LT
1,(C)[i], β
LT
2,(C)[i], β
CS
1,(C)[i], β
CS
2,(C)[i]) using a multivariate normal distribution to allow for corre-
lation between the REs (see Gelman and Hill 2007, for details). This requires the estimation of 15
parameters: five variance terms, one for each of the random slopes, plus ten pairwise correlation
terms between each of the random slopes. While these models result in slightly improved model
fit (the BIC is reduced from 1,758.5 to 1,588.4 for the elective cost MLM, and from −14,796.5 to
−14,972.1 for the emergency cost MLM), we note that the global effects remain almost identical
in terms of sign, size, and significance.
In order to identify the spillovers effects of volume from other specialties onto the focal specialty
we can re-run the above analysis but where we instead include in Equation (5) random specialty-
dependent slopes βLT3,(C)[i], β
LT
4,(C)[i], β
CS
3,(C)[i] and β
CS
4,(C)[i], respectively. We model the random slopes
jointly as a multivariate normal distribution, as above. The results are plotted – together with
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals using 10,000 simulations from the posterior distribution of
the MLMs – in Figure EC.1. We have also plotted the combined slope estimates from the main
estimations, and comparing against this it can be seen that the direction of the individual effects
are consistent with the combined estimates, with 95% confidence intervals overlapping in nearly
all cases.
EC.2. Autocorrelated errors
One concern when working with a panel of time series data is that errors may be autocorrelated,
i.e. costs change slowly and e.g. high costs in one year may indicate that costs will be high in the
next year, also. The standard errors are often underestimated when autocorrelation of the error
terms (at low lags) are positive (Hsiao 2015). This is unlikely to be a major issue for our analysis,
since results are highly significant and standard errors would have to be vastly underestimated for
the results to be misidentified. A bigger concern, however, is that autocorrelation of the errors may
bias the coefficient estimates in the within-between model formulation. We investigate this further
here.
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Figure EC.1 Random slope coefficient estimates for the effect of volume from the other specialties on the cost
of the focal specialty, reported by specialty (black) and combined (red), with bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals.
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Note. A - nervous system; B - eyes & periorbita; C - mouth, head, neck, & ears; D - respiratory system; E - cardiac
surgery & primary cardiac conditions; F - digestive system; G - hepatobiliary & pancreatic system; H - musculoskeletal
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Figure EC.2 Plots of residuals (time t) against lagged residuals (time t− 1) for elective costs (left) and
emergency costs (right).
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To do this, we have taken three approaches. In the first, we regress (using OLS) the residuals (at
time t) from the within-between multilevel models (MLMs) against the lagged residuals (at time
t− 1). A plot of residuals vs. lagged residuals is provided in Figure EC.2, showing little evidence
of any correlation and hence suggesting that our models account for much of the within-trust and
time-related correlation in the error term. This is confirmed by OLS models, with only ∼ 2.8% of
the variance in the residuals for elective costs explained by the lagged residuals, and < 0.1% for
emergency costs.
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We follow the informal approach described above with a traditional testing method. The standard
test for the presence of first-order correlation is the Durbin-Watson statistic. However, this test can
only be performed if the panel is balanced. For an unbalanced panel the recommended approach
is to instead calculate the Baltagi-Wu locally best invariant (LBI) test statistic (Baltagi and Wu
1999). We estimate this using the xtregar command in Stata 12.1. Note that the models that
we estimate this statistic for are not identical to those presented in the paper. This is because
the particular command in Stata does not allow the estimation of multiple random effects, and so
instead we are only able to include trust–specialty REs. Specifically, we replace Equation (6) in
the paper with:
α(thC)[i] = β
tP(t)[i] +β
CP(C)[i] +β
hP(h)[i] +α(hC)[i] . (EC.1)
If anything, since the control structure in the paper includes additional time-related controls (specif-
ically α(th)[i] which has significant explanatory power in the models), the estimates reported here
are likely to be conservative. Calculating the LBI statistic we find them to take values 1.70 for
elective costs and 1.72 for emergency costs, with estimated AR(1) autocorrelation coefficients equal
to 0.28 in both. While critical values are not available in Baltagi and Wu (1999), if there were no
evidence of first-order autocorrelation then these should take value 2. While the LBI statistics are
close to 2 in value, the fact that the estimated AR(1) coefficients are non-zero indicates that it is
worth exploring further.
To extend the above, we re-estimate the models from the paper but where we fit the cross-
sectional time-series multilevel models models allowing the disturbance term to be first-order
autoregressive. Specifically, if thC denotes the disturbance term (random error) corresponding to
specialties C in hospital trust h at time t, then we can specify that the error term takes the form:
thC = ρ× (t−1)hC + ξthC . (EC.2)
where |ρ|< 1 and ξthC is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean 0 and variance
σ2z . Then ρ estimates the residuals are first-order autoregressive. Estimation is made in R (ver-
sion 3.3.3) using the lme() function of the nlme package. One restriction of this package is that
implementing non-nested random effects is prohibitively difficult. To get around this, we replace
Equation (6) in the paper with:
α(thC)[i] = β
tP(t)[i] +β
CP(C)[i] +α(h)[i] +α(hC)[i] . (EC.3)
As discussed above, if anything since the control structure in the paper includes additional time-
related controls (specifically α(th)[i] which has significant explanatory power in the models), the
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Table EC.1 Model parameter estimates – MLMs using
within-between volume decomposition and first-order autocorrelated
errors
Costs
Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.108∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.007) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.012 −0.152∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.188∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.014)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.014 −0.257∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.014)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.050∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.008 −0.144∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.011)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.059 0.159∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.028)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.058 −0.130∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.031)
Control structure
Year Y Y
Specialty line Y Y
Trust 0.086 0.088
Specialty–trust 0.111 0.056
Trust–year N/A N/A
Specialty–year N/A N/A
Residual std. error 0.242 0.177
Correlation structure: AR(1)
ρ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
Model fit
Observations 20,057 21,507
Bayesian inf. crit. 1,192.6 -12,535.7
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; Inclusion of a FE in the con-
trol structure indicated by a “Y”, inclusion of a RE indicated by
the reporting of its estimated standard deviation, else an “N/A” is
indicates in the control structure if neither a FE or RE are included.
estimates reported here are likely to overestimate the size of the ρ. We report in Table EC.1
updated coefficient estimates under this new model specification. We observe that all of the results
are identical in terms of sign and direction as those reported in Table 2 of the paper, and they
are also very similar in terms of scale. Thus, we are confident that the coefficient estimates in the
within-between model formulation in the paper are not biased.
EC.3. Non-linear volume effects
In the paper we assume the effects of (log) volume on (log) cost is linear, i.e. a 1% increase in
volume has an x% effect on cost, regardless of the initial level of volume. Here we discuss relaxing
this assumption to allow for non-linear volume effects. We do this by including the squared values
of both the longitudinal (within) and cross-section (between–hospital-trust) volume terms in the
main multilevel models.
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Figure EC.3 Plots of estimated (mean-centered) volume effects on elective costs in models with only linear
volume effects (solid lines) and in models also with non-linear volume effects (dashed lines).
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Effect of volume on elective costs
In Figures EC.3 and EC.4 are plotted for the elective and emergency patient types, respectively,
the estimated between-effects of volume in models with linear only volume effects (i.e. the estimated
effects reported in the paper) and in models with the inclusion of non-linear (squared terms) volume
between-effects. 95% confidence bands for the non-linear effects are also plotted. These plots have
been restricted to the range over which 98% of the values of the respective volume measures lie
(i.e. excluding the lowest 1% and higher 1%). As shown, there is little evidence to suggest that the
interpretation of the results would change significantly if we had instead used a non-linear volume
specification.
EC.4. Reverse causality
In Section 6.2 of the paper we discuss three tests that we perform in order to examine whether
there is any evidence of reverse causality. Below we provide further details on each of these.
EC.4.1. Cost efficiency driving changes in volume
One possibility, as discussed in the paper, is that the positive relationship identified between volume
and productivity is actually the result of more cost effective hospitals being referred or taking
action to attract a higher volume of patients. This could be e.g. because patients are referred
more often to more productive hospitals or if hospitals use their stronger financial position to take
action (e.g. through marketing or lobbying) to increase their patient pool. To test this we run
additional analysis where we examine whether past financial performance is a predictor of future
patient volumes. If better performing hospitals are able to attract or are referred a higher volume
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Figure EC.4 Plots of estimated (mean-centered) volume effects on emergency costs in models with only linear
volume effects (solid lines) and in models also with non-linear volume effects (dashed lines).
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Effect of volume on emergency costs
of patients then we would expect lower costs in the past to be positively correlated with higher
patient volume in the future.
In order to determine this we closely follow the approach recommended in the multilevel modeling
literature (see e.g. Bell et al. 2014). In particular, we specify eight models where we regress future
volumes on historic elective (emergency) cost ratios. More specifically, the models are specified as
follows:
1. Dependent variables – The four dependent variables in these models are set equal to the
percentage change between year t− 1 and year t in the volume of (i) elective activity in the focal
specialty, (ii) emergency activity in the focal specialty, (iii) elective activity in all specialty other
than the focal specialty, and (iv) emergency activity in all services lines other than the focal
specialty.
2. Primary independent variables of interest – We use one of two possible independent variables:
(a) the standardized cost for elective patients, CostEl, in the focal specialty in the previous year,
and (b) the standardized cost for emergency patients, CostEm, in the focal specialty in the previous
year. These are the variables used as the dependent variables in the various models in the paper. An
increase in value by one unit at the mean, e.g. from 1 to 2, indicates the cost in that specialty–trust
is approximately double that of other trusts.
3. Controls – We control for the specialty–year interaction with a fixed effect. This accounts
for changes in volume common across all hospitals over the sample period (e.g. due to growth in
demand).
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If a hospital has lower cost last year relative to other hospitals in a particular specialty then
this means that they are likely to have made a profit in that specialty (since our “expected cost”
measure used for standardization is approximately equal to the income that a hospital receives).
Thus, if lower cost (more profitable) hospitals are able to generate increased demand next year, we
should expect to see a lower cost this year translating into an increase in volume next year (i.e. our
dependent and independent variables should be negatively correlated). In Table EC.2 we report
the direction, size and significance of the estimated coefficients in these eight models. As is shown,
when estimating the model described above we find the opposite: the higher the cost at a hospital
in a particular year, the more likely the hospital is to increase activity in the following year.
Table EC.2 The effect of a one unit increase in cost relative to expected cost in the focal specialty on the volume of patients seen by
a hospital in the following year.
Dependent variables: Percentage change in volume between year t and t− 1
Elect. vol (focal Sp) Emerg. vol (focal Sp) Elect. vol (other Sps) Emerg. vol (other Sps)
Elect. cost / exp. cost in year t− 1 4.61%∗∗∗ 0.55%∗ 0.95%∗∗∗ 0.17%
Emerg. cost / exp. cost in year t− 1 -2.55% 11.7%∗∗∗ 0.61% 5.50%∗∗∗
Direction of the coefficients in the paper
Dependent variables (below) Elect. vol (focal Sp) Emerg. vol (focal Sp) Elect. vol (other Sps) Emerg. vol (other Sps)
Elect. cost / exp. cost − 0 0 0
Emerg. cost / exp. cost + − + −
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
The effects reported in Table EC.2 suggests insead that higher cost hospitals are likely to respond
by trying to increase their activity, perhaps in an effort to increase profitability by exploiting
potential economies of scale/increasing utilization. If anything, therefore, in the main paper this
is likely to result in higher cost hospitals having higher volumes of patients, rather than lower,
and work against us finding evidence of economies of scale or positive spillovers. We can also see
that there is no evidence that hospitals with high emergency costs in one year attempt to offset
those costs by expanding the number of electives that the treat in the next year. In fact, in Table
EC.2 we have also reported the direction of the main effects identified in the paper, and the results
above suggest that if anything reverse causality is likely to work in the opposite direction of all of
the main effects that we find.
Further, it is worth pointing out that the influence of cost in one year on volume the next year
is very small and unlikely to significantly bias against the results reported in the paper. To see
this, suppose that specialty C at a hospital is 10% more costly in treating elective patients than
the average hospital in year t (suggesting also that they make a loss of approximately 10% in that
year). Then Table EC.2 implies that in year t+ 1 they are likely to expand the volume of electives
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in that specialty by 10%×4.61% = 0.46%. However, based on the estimated coefficients from Table
2 in the paper, elective volume in the focal specialty would be required to increase by ∼ 210%
(= 0.1/0.048) in order to bring about that 10% reduction in cost. Thus, even if the direction of the
bias was in the same direction as the estimated coefficients (which it is not), the potential size of
the bias is small.
Finally, note that we have also extended the model above to allow cost both in years t− 2 and
t−1 to affect costs in year t, and find little evidence of any lagged effect of cost two years prior on
volume in the future (results not reported here).
EC.4.2. Patient selection effects
One possibility, as discussed in the paper, is that the positive relationship identified between volume
and productivity is actually the result of more patients self-selecting these hospitals. As cost and
quality are often correlated, and quality is an unobserved factor that we do not account for in
this analysis, this could be driving the results. First note that this seems unlikely to be the case
for emergency cases, who almost always attend their nearest hospital, and so we believe that it is
appropriate to treat emergency volume as exogenous. However, it is possible that elective patients
choose to go to higher quality and hence lower cost (though the link between high quality and low
cost is not immediately clear – see below for more on this) hospitals. In the paper we argue that
quality information has not been available to patients until recently, but that there may be other
more tacit ways of finding out about the quality of a hospital, e.g. by way of word-of-mouth. Below
we discuss the test that we perform to look into this further.
To test further whether patients appear to be exercising choice based on quality, we have accessed
an “Adult Inpatient Satisfaction Survey” data set (NHS 2017). The survey contains responses
to various questions about patient experience at every acute and specialist NHS trust, for which
“eligible patients were aged 16 years or over, who had spent at least one night in hospital [. . . ]
and were not admitted to maternity or psychiatric units.” This data set was first collected during
the 2005/06 financial year (before our cost data begins) and has been collected every year since,
with the latest data available for the 2015/16 financial year (the last year in our data set). As a
result, we are able to match satisfaction scores to 99.7% of the total trust-years in our data set (75
unmatched observations). The survey contains responses from patients to various questions about
their inpatient stay, which are aggregated into an “Overall Patient Experience Score”. We believe
that the overall experience score should thus act as an excellent proxy for “perceived quality”,
and thus capture much of the “word of mouth” effect that might entice patients to attend certain
hospitals over others.
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First, it is interesting to look at the correlations between the satisfaction scores and the primary
variables in this paper. These are listed below:
• Elective cost: ρ=−0.027, p-value< 0.001
• Emergency cost: ρ=−0.040, p-value< 0.001
• Elective LOS: ρ=−0.048, p-value< 0.001
• Emergency LOS: ρ=−0.090, p-value< 0.001
• Cross-sectional elective volume (focal specialty): ρ= 0.072, p-value< 0.001
• Cross-sectional emergency volume (focal specialty): ρ= 0.038, p-value< 0.001
• Cross-sectional elective volume (other specialties): ρ= 0.174, p-value< 0.001
• Cross-sectional emergency volume (other specialties): ρ= 0.088, p-value< 0.001
The above correlations suggest that higher quality hospitals (as proxied by greater levels of patient
satisfaction) tend to operate at slightly lower cost (the correlations are small but significant) and
that they also are able to attract a higher volume of patients (especially elective patients, as we
hypothesized above). Note that these statistics are correlations only, and this does not necessary
describe a causal relationship, i.e. the higher volume at higher quality hospitals may not only be
because patients are attracted to those hospitals, but also because hospitals that operate at higher
volume are able to deliver a higher quality of service as has been argued and demonstrated in
medical and OM literature.
In order to address whether quality is an important omitted variable, therefore, we have re-run
the models from the paper but where the patient satisfaction score is included as an additional con-
trol. The satisfaction scores are separated into their longitudinal and cross-sectional components,
as per the norm for all of the continuous covariates in the paper. The results after re-estimating
the models are presented in Table EC.3.
As is shown in Table EC.3, there is some evidence to suggest that satisfaction scores are higher
at hospitals that are able to discharge emergency patients faster, with every one standard deviation
increase in the overall satisfaction score resulting in a 3.7% (p-value< 0.001) reduction in emergency
LOS and 3.2% (p-value < 0.01) reduction in cost. Note that this may not be causal: instead it could
be the case that when a patient is discharged faster they are more likely to report a higher level of
satisfaction, rather than the reverse. Regardless, there is no evidence that this has a material impact
for the elective patients. This suggests that cost and quality are, for the most part, independent
or only weakly dependent (the effect sizes are small when they are significant).
Turning to the coefficients of the four main cross-section volume measure, we see in Table EC.3
that inclusion of this quality metric as a control – in order to capture word-of-mouth effects –
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Table EC.3 Model parameter estimates – MLMs using within-between volume
decomposition with inclusion of overall satisfaction scores as control variables
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Overall satisfaction score 0.002 0.003 −0.005 −0.013∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.130∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.075∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.002 −0.177∗∗∗ 0.010∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.127∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ −0.030∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.014) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.034 −0.188∗∗∗ 0.029∗ −0.111∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.014) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Overall satisfaction score −0.021 −0.032∗∗ −0.006 −0.037∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.047∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.012 −0.144∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.107∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.061 0.151∗∗∗ 0.005 0.068∗∗
(0.034) (0.027) (0.014) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.061 −0.125∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.052∗
(0.037) (0.029) (0.015) (0.026)
Model fit
Observations 19,987 21,432 19,987 21,432
Marginal R2 0.127 0.222 0.134 0.160
Conditional R2 0.517 0.624 0.455 0.722
Bayesian inf. crit. 1,797.5 -14,714.5 -26,614.8 -31,014.0
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
results in little to no change in the direction, scale and significance of the coefficient estimates. The
only exception is that the effect of emergency volume from the non-focal specialties on emergency
LOS in the focal specialty becomes significant at the 5% level (coef. =−0.052).
In summary, despite the fact that it is certainly possible that some patients may exercise choice
for where they receive elective services, we find no evidence to suggest perceived quality or word-
of-mouth effects are an important “omitted variable” that might be driving our results.
EC.4.3. Geographically dispersed hospital trusts
In Table EC.4 we report the within-effects estimated for a subset of hospital trusts constrained to
be 20km or more apart (see Section 6.2 of the paper for details). As discussed in the paper, this
restriction has the effect of removing those trusts in more urban areas where patients often have
more choice as to the provider from which they receive treatment. This effect of this restriction
is demonstrated in Figure EC.5, which shows a plot of all trusts (left) together with 20km radius
circles, together with a plot of only those that are at least 20km from the nearest alternative trust.
Turning to the results in Table EC.4, the main results are comparable in sign and scale to those
reported in the paper, though the significant reduction in sample size (a 64% decrease in trust-year
observations from 1,434 to 517, and of observations in general from ∼21,507 to ∼7,754) means that
standard errors have increased and in some case some cases results no longer appear statistically
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Table EC.4 Model parameter estimates - subset of geographically dispersed hospitals
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.105∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.018 −0.127∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.097∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.117∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.017 0.106∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.024) (0.042)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.040 −0.227∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.082∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.021) (0.039)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.070∗∗ 0.020 −0.042∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.066 −0.126∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.024) (0.012) (0.017)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.002 0.123∗ 0.041 0.121∗
(0.067) (0.056) (0.028) (0.057)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.062 −0.102 −0.037 −0.119∗
(0.074) (0.060) (0.030) (0.060)
Model fit
Observations 7,235 7,754 7,235 7,754
Marginal R2 0.146 0.171 0.135 0.238
Conditional R2 0.505 0.567 0.454 0.765
Bayesian inf. crit. 871.1 -3,547.0 -10,082.2 -10,911.2
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Figure EC.5 Plots of all trusts (left) and trusts restricted to only those at least 20km furthest from the nearest
other trust, with 20km radius circles.
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significant at conventional levels of significance, e.g. the effect of emergency volume from other
specialties on emergency costs.
EC.5. Endogenous specialty composition
Not every hospital trust may offer every type of treatment, and while hospitals in the UK are not as
financially driven as in other healthcare systems, e.g the US, the choice of which treatments to offer
(i.e. the composition of the specialties) might still be related to the financial viability of different
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treatment options. In the paper we use PropthCp =
∑
c∈Cthp αtcp to control for the extent to which
hospital trusts offer either a wide or narrow range of treatment options for particular types of
patients or conditions. A plot of these proportions (for each of the specialties) for every trust–year
is given in Figures EC.6 and EC.7 for the elective and emergency patient types, respectively.
As can be seen in Figure EC.6 there is some evidence that not all elective treatments are offered
at all hospital trusts, while Figure EC.7 shows that – other than for Chapter B, which relates to
conditions of the eyes and periorbita – there is little evidence of emergency treatments not being
offered at all trusts (unsurprising, as the unpredictable nature of patient arrivals to the ED means
that hospitals have little choice over which emergency patients they serve). For elective specialties,
though, it is possible that the mix of services that is offered is formed endogenously, i.e. hospital
trusts may choose to only offer treatment to more profitable types of patients. To account for this
in the paper we:
1. Construct the dependent variable by dividing actual costs by the ‘average’ cost, with both
calculated using the same weights (i.e. the same case-mix). So, if e.g. only 80% of the HRGs in a
specialty appear in the numerator, then only the same 80% of HRGs will appear in the denominator
also. In this way costs are adjusted for observable differences in the service offering. More on this
can be found in Section 4.1 of the paper under the subheading “Cost Standardization”.
2. Use hospital trust and/or trust–specialty fixed- and/or random-effects, to capture systematic,
time-invariant differences in the costs at different trusts due to e.g. unobservable differences in the
types of treatment offered.
3. Control in the costs and LOS models for PropthCp which we have interacted with the specialty
C, to capture the fact that costs may differ depending on the range of services offered within a
specialty. (In the MLMs we actually control with both the longitudinal and cross-sectional values
of PropthCp.)
Despite all of this, we also perform a number of additional tests that we describe in the rest of
this Section.
EC.5.1. Relationship between range of services offered, volume and cost
If endogenous formation of the specialty occurred based on cost, then we would expect hospitals
that offer a narrow range of services to also be lower cost, since they would opt to only treat
patients from profitable HRGs. To determine this, let pEl and pEm specify PropthCp when patient
admission category p = El and p = Em respectively, with pElCS and pEmCS the corresponding
cross-section values, and pElLT = pEl − pElCS and pEmLT = pEm− pEmCS the corresponding
longitudinal values. Then we can check whether hospitals that offer a narrow range of services are
lower cost by observing the coefficient estimates of pElCS, pEmCS, pElLT and pEmLT .
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Figure EC.6 Proportion of the “average” elective case-mix offered in each specialty for every trust–year.
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Figure EC.7 Proportion of the “average” emergency case-mix offered in each specialty for every trust–year.
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Table EC.5 Model parameter estimates for propEl and propEm – MLMs using
within-between volume decomposition and random service line dependent slopes for propEl
and propEm
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Prop. elect. 0.148 0.003 0.171∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.100) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022)
Prop. emerg. −0.010 −0.002 0.053 −0.180
(0.107) (0.125) (0.093) (0.138)
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.130∗∗∗ 0.007† −0.074∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.002 −0.176∗∗∗ 0.010† −0.126∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.126∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ −0.031∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.014) (0.023)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.037 −0.185∗∗∗ 0.028∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.014) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Prop. elect. 0.170 −0.123∗∗ −0.025 −0.074†
(0.112) (0.042) (0.051) (0.040)
Prop. emerg. 0.446† 1.098∗∗∗ 0.277† 0.291∗
(0.237) (0.171) (0.145) (0.127)
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.045∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.018 −0.139∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.105∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.041 0.133∗∗∗ 0.003 0.049∗
(0.033) (0.027) (0.013) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.035 −0.110∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.035
(0.036) (0.029) (0.015) (0.026)
Observations 20,057 21,507 20,057 21,507
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Ideally we would report the above coefficients directly from the model in the paper. However,
one problem with this is that, as noted in Section 4.4, in the paper we interact PropthCp by the
specialty fixed effect, PC . The problem with this is that we therefore do not estimate the global
effects of pElCS, pEmCS, pElLT and pEmLT , instead we estimate a specific effect for each specialty.
We would like, therefore, to estimate the global effect but also allow for the fact that there may be
specialty-specific differential effects. To achieve this, we adopt an approach similar to that used for
volume in Section 6.1 of the paper and described further in EC.1 of this document, i.e. we estimate
a global effect plus random slopes for each of the proportion measures.12
Using the random slopes model described above, we present the estimated coefficients in Table
EC.5. The coefficients of interest – for pElCS, pEmCS, pElLT and pEmLT – are given in the rows
denoted Prop. elect. and Prop. emerg.
As is shown in Table EC.5, for emergencies, the greater the proportion of services offered within
a particular specialty (i.e. the wider the scope and more varied the service offering), the greater
also the cost (coef. 1.098). For electives. the effect is positive though insignificant (coef. 0.170). This
12 Since the model is slightly different from the one used in the paper, we will also need to show that the main volume
effects remain consistent. Therefore we also report the estimated coefficients of the volume measures in Table EC.5
– all of which are consistent in terms of sign, scale and significance with those in the paper.
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indicates, as hypothesized above, that those hospital trusts that choose to offer a narrow range of
services tend also to operate at lower cost, perhaps by only providing those less costly services that
they are able to deliver more efficiently.
However, if we look at the correlation between pElCS and nElSCS, and between pEmCS and
nEmSCS we find it to be positive and highly significant, taking values 0.78 and 0.61 respectively.
This suggests that higher volume hospitals are less selective in their service offering (i.e. they offer
a wider range of services and so PropthCp is higher). Since from Table EC.5 we see that hospitals
that offer a wider range of services tend to be more expensive, as a consequence we would therefore
expect larger hospitals to be more expensive as they do not selectively choose cheaper services
to offer. This would work against the findings in our paper (i.e. we find evidence of economies of
scale), suggesting that endogenous formation of service offerings within a specialty is not driving
our results.
EC.5.2. Diversified hospitals
To confirm the robustness of the results, we have re-run the analysis in the paper for a subset
of the data in which we only include observations corresponding to (i) specialty–trusts for which
PropthCp > 0.95 for p∈ {El,Em} in at least 50% of the years they are represented in the data, i.e.
the hospital trust treats at least 95% of the expected case-mix in that specialty in at least 50% of
the years, and (ii) specialty–trust–years for which PropthCp > 0.95 for p∈ {El,Em}, i.e. dropping
all observations where less than 95% of the expected case-mix was treated. This reduces the sample
by 57.0% for the elective patient type, and 18.3% for the emergency patient type. In these models
we do not control for p∈ {El,Em}. This alleviates concerns that the results in the paper may be
spurious and caused by the high correlation between the proportion of conditions treated and the
volume measures. The findings are reported in Table EC.6.
The results in Table EC.6 are consistent with those documented in the paper, with the exception
that we now also see that an increase in the volume of emergencies within the focal specialty results
in an increase in the cost of the electives. This suggests that if we restrict our analysis to the
subsample of specialty–trusts that offer the full spectrum of services in most of the years, then any
increase in within–specialty volume of one admission type may drive up the costs of patients of the
other admission type. While we do not report this report in the paper, since it is estimated from a
more limited subsample of the data, we note that this finding does not counteract our finding that
there are negative spillovers between admission types within a specialty, it only extends it.
Overall, although endogenous specialty formation is a valid concern, we have demonstrated that
it is extremely unlikely to be driving the results reported in the paper.
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Table EC.6 Model parameter estimates - MLMs where observations for which a low
proportion of the case-mix is treated are excluded
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.178∗∗∗ 0.009∗ −0.051∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.035∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.180∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.085∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ −0.007 0.108∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.025) (0.014) (0.023)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.008 −0.144∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.086∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ −0.016∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.062∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.046 0.100∗∗∗ 0.003 0.034
(0.031) (0.026) (0.013) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.065 −0.077∗∗ 0.001 −0.019
(0.037) (0.029) (0.015) (0.026)
Model fit
Observations 8,627 17,576 8,627 17,576
Marginal R2 0.158 0.201 0.193 0.148
Conditional R2 0.619 0.667 0.661 0.787
Bayesian inf. crit. -4,231.7 -16,211.6 -18,675.2 -29,431.2
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
EC.6. The Elective Admission Category
In the paper, we are interested in spillover effects between planned/scheduled (elective) and
unplanned (emergency) patients. As noted in Section 4 under the heading “Admission Categories,”
however, there are actually two different classes of scheduled admission in our data set: day cases
and elective inpatients. In the paper, we merge these two types of scheduled patient into a single
admission category: electives. Here, we provide further justification for this merger, as well as pre-
senting results when day cases and elective inpatients are treated as separate admission categories.
EC.6.1. Biasing of Estimates
With respect to the merger of day-case electives and inpatient (overnight) electives, first note that
for the purposes of reimbursement, for most HRGs there is no distinction made between day cases
and electives, with hospitals receiving the same income for a day case as an overnight elective. This
is done to encourage hospitals to transition more patients to less costly day-cases, where possible,
over time. We must follow this approach since if we do not then those hospitals that have been
more successful at transitioning elective cases to day-cases would seem more costly than those with
fewer day cases, even though in general day cases are cheaper than inpatient electives.
To see why, assume there are two hospitals, A and B, with exactly the same number and case-mix
of patients. Hospital A treats 40% of these patients as day cases, while hospital B has been more
successful at transitioning elective inpatients to day-cases, and treats 60% of these patients as day
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cases. However, in order to treat more patients as day cases, hospital B will have had to have
drawn in more of those patients for who it was ‘borderline’ as to whether they could be treated as
day cases versus elective inpatients, and so are relatively more complex than the average day-case.
This means that the average cost of day-cases at hospital B will be higher than at hospital A – say
$1250 versus $1000. At the same time, since hospital B has drawn more of those ‘borderline’ day-
cases out of the elective inpatient category, this means that those elective inpatients remaining at
hospital B will also be relatively more complex. As a result, the average cost of elective inpatients
at hospital B will also be higher than at hospital A – say $3250 versus $3000.
Continuing the example above, now assume that 100 patients visit each hospital. Then the
average cost at hospital A will be (40 $1000 + 60 $3000)/100 = $2200, while at hospital B it will
be (60 $1250 + 40 $3250)/100 = $2050. Thus, hospital B is lower cost than hospital A, which is
to be expected since hospital B has been able to transition more patients to less expensive day-case
procedures. If we were to exclude day cases, then it would appear instead as if hospital B is more
expensive than hospital A ($3250 versus $3000). As a result of this, we argue that it is important
to combine these two types of patients, as we do in the paper.
EC.6.2. Separating Day Cases and Elective Inpatients
Despite the potential bias highlighted in Section EC.6.1, it is possible to separate the two elective
patient classes and estimate the effects of three types of volume (i) day case, (ii) elective inpatient,
and (iii) emergency inpatient on cost within each of the specialties for each of these patient classes.
Results are presented in Table EC.7.
Examining Table EC.7, we see a number of interesting features. First, as predicted in Sec-
tion EC.6.1, after separating out elective inpatients and day cases, we no longer find evidence of
economies of scale within the elective category (coef.=0.032). In fact, exactly as we anticipated,
the sign of economies of scale effect for elective patients flipped. To see why the direction of the
effect changes, note that by dropping day cases we are left only with elective inpatients. There are
now two potential reasons why a hospital may have a large number of elective inpatients relative
to their peers: (1) they operate at larger scale, (2) they have been less successful in transitioning
elective cases to day cases. Note that it is this second point that introduces the upwards bias in
our coefficient estimate.
Second, note that there is no evidence that the volume of day cases has an impact on the cost
of either elective inpatients or emergency cases. In other words, there is no discernible spillover
from day cases to elective or emergency costs. Turning to the cost of day cases, there is evidence
of strong economies of scale within the class of day case patients, with each doubling in volume
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Table EC.7 Model parameter estimates - separate elective and day
cases
Costs
Day Case Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Day case vol. (focal SL) −0.080∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Day case vol. (other SLs) −0.072∗ −0.030 0.060∗∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.020)
Elect. vol. (focal SL) −0.012 −0.064∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
Elect. vol. (other SLs) −0.066 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.037) (0.032) (0.023)
Emerg. vol. (focal SL) −0.011 0.009 −0.180∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.007)
Emerg. vol. (other SLs) 0.056 −0.034 −0.179∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.036) (0.025)
Cross-sectional effects
Day case vol. (focal SL) −0.091∗∗∗ 0.005 0.010
(0.011) (0.009) (0.006)
Day case vol. (other SLs) 0.016 −0.011 0.034
(0.051) (0.044) (0.032)
Elect. vol. (focal SL) 0.048∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.007)
Elect. vol. (other SLs) −0.006 0.055 0.100∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.036) (0.026)
Emerg. vol. (focal SL) −0.023 −0.044∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.011)
Emerg. vol. (other SLs) −0.003 −0.047 −0.109∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.043) (0.030)
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
within the same specialty resulting in a 9.1% decrease in cost. On the other hand, there is some
evidence that in hospitals with higher volumes of elective inpatients within the same specialty, the
cost of day cases is higher (4.8% for every doubling in elective volume in the same specialty). We
must caution about reading too much into these results, however, due to the issues outlined in
Section EC.6.1.
EC.7. Modeling – data alternatives
In this section we report the results from a number of other estimations made using:
EC.7.1. Capped costs
It is not uncommon for hospital trusts’ costs to be magnified (or shrunk) by a few extremely
expensive (or low-cost) patients. Therefore, when government agencies calculate hospital trust
compensation based on HRG tariffs, the costs are often trimmed to exclude extreme observations.
We adopt a similar approach by limiting the influence of “extreme” costs by capping them at a
minimum or a maximum value. We do this by constraining in every hospital trust h the average
cost of treating patients with HRG c and of patient type p (i.e. costthcp) to take maximum value
equal to 5 multiplied by the across-trust median in that year t, and minimum value equal to 1/5
multiplied by the across-trust median. These caps leave the same sample as in the paper, but limits
the extent to which extreme values for individual cost can affect the results.
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Table EC.8 Model parameter estimates – MLMs using within-between volume
decomposition
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.123∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.075∗∗∗ 0.005†
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.001 −0.171∗∗∗ 0.010∗ −0.129∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.124∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ −0.032∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.032 −0.174∗∗∗ 0.030∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.047∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.009 −0.137∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.045 0.123∗∗∗ 0.001 0.046†
(0.031) (0.026) (0.013) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.049 −0.098∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.031
(0.034) (0.028) (0.014) (0.026)
Model fit
Observations 20,057 21,507 20,057 21,507
Marginal R2 0.130 0.217 0.135 0.146
Conditional R2 0.528 0.640 0.457 0.724
Bayesian inf. crit. -986.9 -18,287.1 -26,792.7 -31,134.2
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
We report in Table EC.8 the results of the cost and LOS estimations, which are nearly identical
to those reported in the paper.
EC.7.2. Common HRGs
In the paper we compared costs and LOS at hospital trusts across the set of all HRGs c treated in
year t. An alternative to this would have been to compare hospital trusts across a set of common
HRGs, i.e. excluding those conditions that are more rare for which treatment is typically only
offered in large, teaching or specialist hospitals. This has the additional benefit that it partially
reduces the potential for bias caused by endogeneous specialty formation (see Section EC.5 of this
document), since we only compare costs against a base set of HRGs c that are widely provided
(and so typically higher volume also, with less discretion in their provision).
To achieve this, we specify that an HRG is only included in the comparison if it is provided by
at least 80% of baseline set, Tb, of 116 reference trusts in a particular year. (See Section 4.1 of the
paper for more on the baseline trusts.) In the paper we compare hospital costs across approximately
1,500 elective HRGs and 1,400 emergency HRGs per year on average. Once we apply the above
condition, we instead are comparing hospital costs across approximately 480 elective HRGs and
750 emergency HRGs per year on average. While we compare across significantly fewer HRGs, we
note that these capture 87.8% (78.5%) of the total elective activity (cost) and 96.6% (91.1%) of
the total emergency activity (cost) over the sample period, respectively. This indicates clearly that
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Table EC.9 Model parameter estimates - calculated on a set of common HRGs
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.142∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.015 −0.158∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.120∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.127∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ −0.034∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.014) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.024 −0.209∗∗∗ 0.029∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.014) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.017† 0.032∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.025 −0.061∗∗∗ 0.015∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.025 0.109∗∗∗ 0.001 0.030
(0.034) (0.028) (0.013) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.012 −0.136∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.041
(0.037) (0.030) (0.014) (0.026)
Model fit
Observations 20,021 21,471 20,021 21,471
Marginal R2 0.111 0.184 0.125 0.129
Conditional R2 0.498 0.624 0.424 0.716
Bayesian inf. crit. 4,960.7 -14,818.1 -24,639.5 -30,425.0
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
those HRGs that are kept in the sample are those that are higher volume and more prevalent across
hospitals. Importantly for the analysis presented here, the volume metrics are left unchanged and
are equal to the four original volume measures used in the paper. Note also that the sample size
goes down slightly since there are are some hospitals that by random chance only treat rarer cases of
certain conditions within a specialty. As such, once we restrict the sample to only the most common
set of conditions we may have no cost or LOS data associated with some specialty–trust–years.
The results, using the same estimation method as in the paper, are provided in Table EC.9. As
can be seen, the sign, direction and significance of the estimation on the subset of more common
HRGs are similar to those reported in the paper.
EC.7.3. Minimum specialty size
In Section EC.7.2 above we consider the possibility that the composition of HRGs used to compare
hospital trusts (in particular, the inclusion of rarer conditions) may affect the results. Another
possibility is that the inclusion of hospital trusts which treat only a low volume of activity within
a particular specialty (i.e. which provide no or only a limited scope of service) may be outliers and
may be influencing the results.
To examine this, we have re-run the cost models from the paper on a subset of the data such that
only those years in which a trust treats at least 25% of the median elective volume and emergency
volume of activity within a particular specialty are included in the sample. The median is calculated
in each year across the baseline set, Tb, of 116 reference trusts. (See Section 4.1 of the paper for
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Table EC.10 Model parameter estimates - excluding hospital-years with low service line
volume
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.158∗∗∗ 0.010∗ −0.075∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.013 −0.202∗∗∗ 0.010∗ −0.142∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.092∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ −0.016 0.094∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.014) (0.023)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.016 −0.173∗∗∗ 0.029∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.013) (0.024)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.054∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.008 −0.148∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.041 0.136∗∗∗ 0.005 0.048∗
(0.032) (0.027) (0.013) (0.024)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.049 −0.105∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.035
(0.036) (0.029) (0.015) (0.026)
Model fit
Observations 18,701 21,171 18,701 21,171
Marginal R2 0.120 0.216 0.123 0.146
Conditional R2 0.542 0.633 0.509 0.734
Bayesian inf. crit. -1,418.3 -15,250.7 -29,468.8 -31,557.7
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
more on the baseline trusts.) This reduces the sample by ∼7% (∼2%) from 20,057 (21,507) elective
(emergency) observation to 18,701 (21,171). The results – provided in Table EC.10 – are almost
identical to those in the paper, suggesting the findings are not heavily influenced by the presence
of trust–specialty with a low volume of activity.
EC.7.4. Multi-site versus single-site hospitals
The analysis in the paper was run on the set of all trusts operating in England. As mentioned in
Section 4.4 of the paper, trusts may operate multiple hospitals across multiple sites. While often
there is a main hospital site that treats the vast majority of the patients, there are a number of
hospital trusts (e.g. Guy’s and St. Thomas’ in London) where the same trust operates multiple large
hospitals. As it is not possible in our data to distinguish between which patients were treated at
which site, it could for such hospital trusts be the case that specialties and/or elective or emergency
patients are split over multiple sites. The scale and scope effects we identify may be affected by
this, despite the fact that we have taken steps to account for this with control variables.
EC.7.4.1. Single hospital trusts To investigate this further, we have repeated the analysis
from the paper using a subset of the data corresponding to those trusts that only operate a single
hospital site. This has the effect of reducing the sample by 43.3%, from 21,507 observations to
12,192. In these models we remove the controls for (i) the number of sites operated by the hospital,
and (ii) the concentration of beds across sites, since there are equal for all single hospital sites. The
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Table EC.11 Model parameter estimates - subset of trusts operating one hospital site
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.100∗∗∗ 0.014∗ −0.073∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.004 −0.158∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.107∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.156∗∗∗ 0.086∗ −0.026 0.153∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.018) (0.032)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.096∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ 0.035† −0.155∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.018) (0.032)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.046∗∗ 0.027∗∗ −0.017∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.004 −0.129∗∗∗ 0.016∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.046 0.113∗∗∗ 0.001 0.061†
(0.038) (0.034) (0.015) (0.032)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.044 −0.095∗ 0.022 −0.048
(0.046) (0.040) (0.018) (0.037)
Model fit
Observations 11,363 12,192 11,363 12,192
Marginal R2 0.134 0.216 0.147 0.148
Conditional R2 0.496 0.622 0.429 0.718
Bayesian inf. crit. 2,821.1 -6,339.4 -12,773.6 -14,679.7
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
results, reported in Table EC.11, show that even when restricting the sample there is little change
in the sign or scale of the main results reported in the paper. As such, in the paper we report the
results from all trusts.
EC.7.4.2. Concentrated trusts We also repeat the analysis of the paper for the subset of
trusts where either (i) the hospital operates only a single hospital site, or (ii) the hospital operates
multiple hospital sites but the beds are highly concentrated in a single site. In particular, to satisfy
(ii) we require that at least 80% of the beds operated by that hospital trust are located in a single
site. Applying this restriction reduces the sample to 14,442 observations (a reduction of approx.
32.8%). Results, reported in Table EC.12, show again that there is no evidence of a change to our
findings when applying this restriction.
EC.7.5. Asset changes
Since the panel spans 10 years, another concern might be that the asset structure of the hos-
pitals changes over that period. If this were the case then the assumption of fixed capacity as
noted in Footnote 6 would be violated. This might influence the cost and volumes at a hospital
simultaneously, and may lead to spurious results. First, note that we account for any time-varying
variation in cost common to all specialties within a hospital with the trust–year controls. Thus,
if time-varying unobserved heterogeneity affects our results then this must occur at the specialty
level within an individual hospital. We delve into this below.
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Table EC.12 Model parameter estimates - subset of trusts operating one or more sites
where beds highly concentrated in single site
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.126∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.003 −0.169∗∗∗ 0.011† −0.115∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.138∗∗∗ 0.061† −0.015 0.138∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.032) (0.018) (0.031)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.092∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.148∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.017) (0.031)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.052∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗ 0.011†
(0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.011 −0.148∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.118∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.056 0.137∗∗∗ −0.005 0.048†
(0.039) (0.032) (0.014) (0.029)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.019 −0.094∗ 0.021 −0.046
(0.047) (0.037) (0.016) (0.033)
Model fit
Observations 13,463 14,442 13,463 14,442
Marginal R2 0.120 0.212 0.134 0.158
Conditional R2 0.509 0.626 0.426 0.728
Bayesian inf. crit. 2,945.9 -8,309.8 -15,502.9 -18,259.6
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
In Figure EC.8 we have plotted the distribution of specialty–trust level longitudinal volume (i.e.
the difference between volume in a particular year and the mean volume across all years) for each
specialty. This is on the log scale, indicating that although rare, there are some instances where
specialties exhibit reasonably large changes in volume that may be worth exploring further (note
that this is more likely to occur at the level of an individual specialty, than at a hospital as a
whole, demonstrated by the greater variation for the focal specialty shown in the left-hand column
of Figure EC.8).
In order to check whether there is any evidence that our results are affected by potential struc-
tural changes within a hospital/specialty over time, we have repeated our analysis but have split
the time horizon in two, so that the maximum period over which we assume the asset configuration
at a hospital remains relatively stable is 5 years, rather than 10. To achieve this we do the following:
• If a hospital trust h is observed in the sample for 6 or more years, we separate the observations
for that trust into two. Specifically, if th is the number of years that hospital h is observed, we
separate the observations corresponding to the first floor(th/2) years and last ceiling(th/2) years,
and treat these as belonging to two separate organization (i.e. we generate two new trust indicators
h1 and h2, corresponding to the two periods). This increases the effective number of trusts from
169 to 312.
• We re-generate cross-section and longitudinal volume measures for the new set of 312 trusts.
• We re-run the multilevel models with the updated volume measures.
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Figure EC.8 Distribution of longitudinal (within hospital) volume by specialty: natural logarithm of focal
specialty volume (left) and other specialties volume (right), for elective (top) and emergency (bottom)
admissions.
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Another way to think of this is that we effectively allow each hospital to have one major structural
midway through the observation period (so long as they are observed for 6 or more years). This will
act to capture some of the potential time-varying heterogeneity. The estimated model coefficients
under this updated specification are supplied in Table EC.13 below.
As can be seen, all of the results from the paper continue to hold even when we allow for
structural changes in hospitals over the sample period. In fact, comparing to the main results in the
paper shows there is very little change in estimated coefficients. This suggests that time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity at the specialty level (not trust level, since this is already captured with
trust-year level random effects) is unlikely to be an important omitted component of our control
structure. To see why, note that in the models we run above we effectively double the number
of specialty–trust random effects. These additional random effects should capture a component of
any potential time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, since the random effects are allowed to take
different values across the two periods for each trust and specialty (with volume differences already
picked up with the updated cross-sectional volume measures).
Given the fact that our results do not change after accounting for time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity as described above, we have little reason to be concerned that this plays a significant
role here.
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Table EC.13 Model parameter estimates – Split sample
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.107∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.071∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.110∗∗ 0.020 −0.033† 0.076∗
(0.036) (0.034) (0.018) (0.031)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.004 −0.152∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.114∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.002 −0.183∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.081∗∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.015) (0.026)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.065∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.024 0.133∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.055∗∗
(0.026) (0.022) (0.011) (0.019)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.011 −0.145∗∗∗ 0.015∗ −0.103∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.012 −0.103∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.041∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.012) (0.021)
Model fit
Observations 20,057 21,507 20,057 21,507
Marginal R2 0.119 0.211 0.135 0.136
Conditional R2 0.575 0.673 0.506 0.755
Bayesian inf. crit. 1,399.9 -15,266.4 -26,395.6 -31,348.6
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
EC.8. Combined panel analysis
In the main paper we perform separate analysis for the subset of elective costs and emergency
costs. There we two reasons for doing this: (1) we have no reason to believe apriori that the impact
of each of the covariates (both controls and the volume effects of interest) on costs will be the same
for emergencies and electives, and (2) in order to control properly in this model would require
us to go from a three dimensional panel (year, trust, specialty) to four dimensional (year, trust,
specialty, patient type), and this significantly increases the number of random and fixed effects that
must be estimated in the model, and hence the computation time. While point (1) can be resolved
by interacting the independent variables with the patient type, point (2) is more problematic,
especially given the large number of robustness checks required in order to ensure the validity and
reliability of the results. One problem with the approach in the paper, however, is that it inherently
assumes that the errors across the two panels (electives and emergencies) are uncorrelated. There
may be reason to suspect that this should not be the case, though, since e.g. if the cost of elective
patients within a particular specialty at a particular hospital is high (or low) this may suggest that
the cost of emergency patients within the same specialty and hospital trust will also be high (or
low).
To test whether our results are robust to re-specification where we allow elective and emergency
costs to be correlated, we have re-estimated the main results presented from the paper under a
new model specification given as follows:
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where : Type denotes an interaction between the volume effects and the patient type (elective or
emergency), and the intercept is given by
α(thCp)[i] = bX +β
tP(t)[i] +β
CP(C)[i] +P(p)[i] +α(h)[i] +α(th)[i] +α(tC)[i] +α(hC)[i]
+α(hp)[i] +α(thp)[i] +α(tCp)[i] +α(hCp)[i] . (EC.5)
Using the notation recommended in Gelman and Hill (2007), the index (thCp)[i] denotes the time, t,
hospital trust, h, specialty, C, and patient type p, corresponding to observation i, and i ∼N (0, σ2)
is the idiosyncratic error term. The terms α(x)[i], where (x)[i] takes values (h)[i], (th)[i], (tC)[i],
(hC)[i], (hp)[i], (th)[i], (tCp)[i], and (hCp)[i], denote the hospital trust, trust–year, specialty–
year and specialty–trust, trust–patient-type, trust–year–patient-type, specialty–year–patient-type
and specialty–trust–patient-type random effects (REs), respectively, which are all assumed to be
Normal random variables with a standard deviation to be estimated.
Table EC.14 Model parameter estimates – MLMs using within-between volume
decomposition
Costs LOS
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency
Longitudinal effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.130∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.074∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) 0.002 −0.180∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) −0.109∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ −0.035∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) 0.047 −0.196∗∗∗ 0.045∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.020) (0.019)
Cross-sectional effects
Elect. vol. (focal Sp) −0.049∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Emerg. vol. (focal Sp) −0.010 −0.144∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.106∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Elect. vol. (other Sps) 0.059† 0.168∗∗∗ 0.003 0.057∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019)
Emerg. vol. (other Sps) −0.037 −0.108∗∗ 0.007 −0.023
(0.032) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 41,564 41,564
†p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
The results from this combined model specification are reported in Table EC.14, and are consis-
tent with those reported in the main paper.
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EC.9. Generating the dependent variable
Over the next two pages we provide an example demonstrating how the dependent variable is
generated.
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Generating	the	dependent	variable	
	
	
This	example	runs	through	how	HRG-level	costs	are	aggregated	to	the	HRG-chapter	level,	using	real	data	from	the	
2014-15	financial	year.	To	demonstrate	we	will	assume	there	are	only	two	hospital	trusts,	RGT	(Cambridge	University	
Hospitals)	and	RTH	(Oxford	University	Hospitals),	and	that	HRG	chapter	of	interest	is	“C”	(corresponding	to	the	
Mouth,	Head,	Neck	and	Ears).	To	simplify	further,	within	HRG	chapter	C	we	assume	there	are	only	two	HRGs:	
	
• CZ21V:	Minor	Head,	Neck	and	Ear	Disorders,	with	CC	
• CZ21Y:	Minor	Head,	Neck	and	Ear	Disorders,	without	CC	
	
The	table	below	gives	the	volume,	average	cost,	and	average	length	of	stay	(in	days)	of	patients	in	each	trust,	for	
each	type	of	patient	(DC	=	day	case,	EL	=	elective	inpatient,	EM	=	emergency	inpatient),	for	each	of	the	above	HRGs.	
	
Hospital	 HRG	 Patient	type	 Volume	 Average	cost	 Average	LoS	
RGT	 CZ21V	 EL	 7	 1,788	 2.28	
RGT	 CZ21V	 EM	 611	 646	 1.56	
RGT	 CZ21Y	 DC	 14	 340	 1	
RGT	 CZ21Y	 EL	 3	 2,171	 2	
RGT	 CZ21Y	 EM	 152	 544	 1.11	
RTH	 CZ21V	 DC	 6	 928	 1	
RTH	 CZ21V	 EL	 4	 3,351	 2	
RTH	 CZ21V	 EM	 645	 623	 1.31	
RTH	 CZ21Y	 DC	 3	 871	 1	
RTH	 CZ21Y	 EL	 8	 2,857	 1.5	
RTH	 CZ21Y	 EM	 209	 559	 1.11	
	
We	now	describe	how	the	dependent	variable	is	constructed	from	the	above.	
	
Preparing	the	data	
	
1. First,	we	combine	DC	and	EL	patients	by	taking	their	weighted-average	–	e.g.,	the	average	cost	of	DC-EL	
patients	with	HRG	CZ21V	in	RTH	is	equal	to	(6*928+4*3,351)/10	=	1,897	–	to	form	the	new	table	below:	
	
Hospital	 HRG	 Patient	type	 Volume	 Average	cost	 Average	LoS	
RGT	 CZ21V	 DC-EL	 	7		 	1,788		 	2.28		
RGT	 CZ21V	 EM	 	611		 	646		 	1.56		
RGT	 CZ21Y	 DC-EL	 	17		 	663		 	1.18		
RGT	 CZ21Y	 EM	 	152		 	544		 	1.11		
RTH	 CZ21V	 DC-EL	 	10		 	1,897		 	1.40		
RTH	 CZ21V	 EM	 	645		 	623		 	1.31		
RTH	 CZ21Y	 DC-EL	 	11		 	2,315		 	1.36		
RTH	 CZ21Y	 EM	 	209		 	559		 	1.11		
	
2. We	also	combine	the	across-hospital	data	and	calculate	for	each	HRG–admission-type	combination:	(a)	the	
percentage	of	patients	of	that	admission-type	allocated	to	that	HRG,	(b)	the	average	cost	of	treating	those	
patients,	and	(c)	their	average	length	of	stay.	This	produces	the	table	below.	
	
HRG	 Patient	type	 %	of	total	volume	 Combined	average	cost	 Combined	average	LoS	
CZ21V	 DC-EL	 37.8%	 1,852	 1.76	
CZ21V	 EM	 77.7%	 634	 1.43	
CZ21Y	 DC-EL	 62.2%	 1,312	 1.25	
CZ21Y	 EM	 22.3%	 553	 1.11	
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Case-mix	adjustment	
	
3. To	case-mix	adjust,	we	first	take	the	across-hospital	%	of	total	volume	associated	with	each	HRG	and	
multiply	this	by	the	average	cost/LoS	in	each	hospital.	For	example,	the	case-mix	adjusted	cost	of	HRG	CZ21V	
at	RGT	is	equal	to	1,788*0.378	=	675.	This	results	in	the	following:	
	
Hospital	 HRG	 Patient	type	 %	of	total	volume	 Case-mix	adjusted	cost	 Case-mix	adjusted	LoS	
RGT	 CZ21V	 DC-EL	 37.8%	 	675		 0.86	
RGT	 CZ21V	 EM	 77.7%	 	502		 1.21	
RGT	 CZ21Y	 DC-EL	 62.2%	 	413		 0.73	
RGT	 CZ21Y	 EM	 22.3%	 	121		 0.25	
RTH	 CZ21V	 DC-EL	 37.8%	 	717		 0.53	
RTH	 CZ21V	 EM	 77.7%	 	484		 1.02	
RTH	 CZ21Y	 DC-EL	 62.2%	 	1,441		 0.85	
RTH	 CZ21Y	 EM	 22.3%	 	125		 0.25	
	
Aggregating	costs	to	the	HRG	chapter	level	
	
4. The	next	step	is	to	take	the	sum	of	the	case-mix	adjusted	costs	in	each	hospital	for	each	admission-type.	This	
is	equal	to	the	chapter	level	average	cost	per	patient	(i.e.,	the	cost	of	treating	an	`average’	patient	in	that	
hospital).	For	example,	the	average	cost	of	an	`average’	DC-EL	patient	at	RGT	is	equal	to	675+413	=	1,088.	
5. We	also	calculate	the	`expected’	average	cost	of	treating	an	`average’	patient.	This	equals	the	sum	of	the	
case-mix	weighted	“combined	average	costs”	from	the	table	in	(2.),	e.g.	for	DC-EL	patients	is	equal	to	
(0.378*1,852	+	0.622*1,312)	=	1,516.	Putting	this	and	the	output	from	(4.)	into	a	table	gives:	
	
Hospital	 HRG	chapter	
Patient	
type	
%	of	total	
volume	
Avg.	cost	-	
chapter	level	
Avg.	LoS	-	
chapter	level	
Exp.	cost	-	
chapter	level	
Exp.	LoS	-	
chapter	level	
RGT		 C	 DC-EL	 100.0%	 1,088	 1.59	 1,516	 1.44	
RGT	 C	 EM	 100.0%	 623	 1.46	 616	 1.36	
RTH	 C	 DC-EL	 100.0%	 2,157	 1.38	 1,516	 1.44	
RTH	 C	 EM	 100.0%	 609	 1.27	 616	 1.36	
	
6. Finally,	we	divide	the	chapter	level	total	cost/LoS	at	each	hospital	through	by	the	expected	total	cost/LoS	to	
generate	a	case-mix	adjusted	cost	and	LoS	index	for	each	patient	type.	These	indices	are	the	dependent	
variables	used	in	our	analysis.	
	
Hospital	 HRG	chapter	 Patient	type	 %	of	total	volume	 Cost	index	 LoS	index	
RGT	 C	 DC-EL	 100.0%	 0.72	 1.10	
RGT	 C	 EM	 100.0%	 1.01	 1.07	
RTH	 C	 DC-EL	 100.0%	 1.42	 0.95	
RTH	 C	 EM	 100.0%	 0.99	 0.93	
	
Notes	
• In	Step	2,	the	%	of	patients	in	each	HRG	and	the	combined	average	cost/LoS	is	instead	determined	from	a	set	
of	116	reference	trusts	(rather	than	the	set	of	all	trusts).	These	reference	trusts	are	the	set	of	trusts	that	are	
present	in	our	data	in	each	of	the	10	years.	This	ensures	that	the	case-mix	is	relatively	stable	over	time.	The	
exception	to	this	is	when	the	focal	trust	is	one	of	the	reference	trusts.	In	this	case,	the	combined	average	
cost/LoS	for	that	focal	trust	is	instead	calculated	over	all	reference	trusts	except	for	the	focal	trust.	This	
ensures	that	the	numerator	(hospital	specified	average	chapter	level	cost/LoS)	and	denominator	(expected	
average	chapter	level	cost/LoS	over	the	set	of	reference	trusts)	are	independent	in	Steps	5/6.	
• When	an	HRG	is	not	present	in	the	numerator	of	the	cost/LoS	indices	–	which	can	occur	if	a	patient	with	that	
HRG	is	not	treated	in	that	hospital	in	that	year	–	then	the	chapter	level	avg.	cost/LoS	calculated	in	Step	4	will	
be	lower	than	in	other	hospitals.	We	thus	also	need	to	deflate	expected	avg.	cost/LoS.	To	achieve	this,	we	
simply	do	not	include	that	HRG	when	summing	to	calculate	expected	cost/LoS	in	Step	5.	We	also	keep	track	
of	the	%	of	the	`average	patient’	that	is	observed	in	each	hospital	(which	in	our	example	is	100%	in	all	cases).	
This	becomes	another	control	in	our	analysis.	
ec32 e-companion to Freeman, Savva, Scholtes: Economies of Scale and Scope in Hospitals
EC.10. Difference between longitudinal and cross-section effects
First, it is important to note that the two effects capture distinct phenomena. This point was
made in recent paper published in SMJ titled “A tale of two effects: Using longitudinal data to
compare within- and between-firm effects” (Certo et al. 2017). In the managerial summary of the
paper, the authors write: “Strategy research examines two sources of variation over time: what is
occurring within the firm (e.g., Do firms perform better over time when investing more in R&D?)
and what is occurring between firms (e.g., Do firms investing more in R&D outperform firms
investing less in R&D?). [. . . ] Our article highlights the benefits of theorizing and testing these two
sources of variance, providing scholars the ability to broaden both the theoretical and empirical
contribution of their research. This distinction is important to how research informs managerial
decision making.” Translating the R&D examples above into our context gives the following two
questions about the sources of variation in hospital costs:
1. Do hospital costs decrease over time as they increase the volume of patients that they treat?
2. Do hospitals that have a higher volume of patients operate at lower cost than hospitals that
have a lower volume of patients?
In this paper we ask these questions at the level for each specialty and admission type, allowing
volume to differ along four dimensions (same specialty and type, different specialty same type,
same specialty different type, different specialties and type).
If we assume that assets are frozen over the observation period,13 then the first question above
become effectively: as hospitals increase the volume of patients that they treat using the same
set of assets, do hospital costs reduce? It is clear that any impact of volume on cost in these
circumstances would be predominantly a utilization effect: treating a higher volume of patients
with the same assets would indicate that the hospital is utilizing those assets more effectively. In
addition, there is a second order effect related to a change in focus within the hospital: all else
being constant, if there is an increase in volume within a particular specialty then the degree of
strategic emphasis placed on this specialty also increases, and internal processes may become better
aligned towards delivering cheaper care in that specialty relative to others. On the other hand,
if a hospital that has a higher volume of patients is able to operate at lower cost then this is an
indication of scale/scope economies. It turns out that question 1. is measured using the longitudinal
(within) volume measures, while question 2. is measured using the cross-sectional (between) volume
measures. This is why the cross-sectional (between) volume measures are the focus of this study.
13 This is a reasonable assumption given the 2008 economic crisis. Nevertheless, in EC.7.5 we show that our results
are not overly sensitive to this assumption.
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Example
To make the points made above more concrete, we provide an example below. Suppose we have
only two hospitals, A and B, and one specialty, e.g. the nervous system, and that hospitals A and
B experience no changes in capacity over an e.g. 5 year observation period. Hospital A treats the
same number of elective patients in each of the 5 years, say 100. Hospital B, meanwhile, treats
140 electives in year 1 which increases by 5 each year until in year 5 they are treating 160 elective
patients. Suppose that the relative cost of elective care at hospital A remains the same in each
year, taking value 1 (i.e. equal to the average), while the relative cost of elective care at hospital
B decreases by 0.025 per year from 1.0 in year 1 to 0.9 in year 5. Are there economies of scale?
We can try answer the above one of two ways, either (i) by looking at volume differences across
hospitals, or else (ii) volume changes within hospitals. Let’s say that we use (ii). Then since only
hospital B exhibits volume changes over time, we must rely on hospital B only to estimate the
scale effects. The data above woulds suggest that every 5 unit increase in elective volume decreases
relative costs by 0.025, i.e. possible evidence of economies of scale. But recall capacity is fixed, so
this isn’t really capturing benefits associated with scale. Instead this is measuring an improvement
in capacity utilization over time, i.e. hospital B is able to make better use of its resources to treat
more patients for the same amount of capacity, and so is also able to reduce per patient cost.
However, observe that hospital B is larger overall than hospital A, over the 5 years the average
volume at hospital A is 100 while at hospital B it is 150. How then can we determine whether
the larger scale of hospital B translates into reduced costs above and beyond the utilization gains
hospital B achieves?
In order to identify economies of scale we must instead compare volume across hospitals while
controlling for utilization changes (i.e. variation in volume) within a hospital over time. To account
for these utilization changes we can use the longitudinal volume measures discussed above. Specif-
ically, the average volume at hospital A over the 5 year period is 100, and at hospital B it is
150. Taking the differences between the volume of patients in any year and the average gives the
longitudinal volume measure. This is equal to 0 at hospital A in each year, since volume does not
change over time. At hospital B this is equal to −10 in year 1, increasing to +10 in year 5. The
relative cost and longitudinal and cross-sectional volume are given in Table EC.15 below.
Controlling for utilization changes is equivalent to comparing the two hospitals when the
longitudinal volume measures are set equal in value. This occurs when longitudinal volume is
equal to 0 in hospitals A and B, or when relative cost and A is equal to 1.0 and at B is equal to
0.95 as shown in Table EC.15. Thus, even after accounting for changes in utilization over time
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Table EC.15 Example demonstrating difference between
longitudinal and cross-sectional volume.
Year
1 2 3 4 5
Relative cost, hospital A 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
LT elective volume, hospital A 0 0 0 0 0
CS elective volume, hospital A 100 100 100 100 100
Relative cost, hospital B 1.0 0.975 0.95 0.925 0.9
LT elective volume, hospital B -10 -5 0 5 10
CS elective volume, hospital B 150 150 150 150 150
LT corresponds to longitudinal volume, CS corresponds to cross-
sectional volume.
there is still a cost difference between hospitals A and B. But hospital B operates at a larger scale
than hospital A, so perhaps some of the cost difference can be explained as a function of this. In
fact, this is exactly the scale economies that we are trying to identify, i.e. how costs differ across
hospitals that operate at different levels of volume! In this example, hospital B treats 50 elective
patients per year more than hospital A on average. This suggests that an additional 50 patients
can reduce cost from 1.0 to 0.95, i.e. each additional patient a hospital treats reduces relative cost
by 0.001. Note that in reality we control through our data and panel structure for many other
factors (both observed and unobserved) that may drive differences in costs, and also use over 150
hospitals rather than just 2 to estimate this relationship, as well as aggregating over 16 distinct
specialties.
Identification of effects of interest
Note that the formulation described above does not ‘control out’ from the between-hospital (cross-
sectional) volume measures any of the possible drivers of the scale effects. For example, the fact
that hospital B has a higher volume than hospital A which may confer advantages associated with
e.g. learning, utilization14, etc., still exists. Thus our theory and the measure that we use to capture
it are consistent.
EC.11. Literature Review
A contribution of our work is to explore the question of whether, from an efficiency standpoint,
scheduled elective activity and unscheduled emergency activity should be coproduced within the
same general hospital, and also whether there are productivity spillovers between different medical
specialties (specialties). This is an important question as spillovers across these dimensions are
highly relevant for the current debate on business model innovation in regional hospital systems.
14 We control with our longitudinal volume measures for changes in utilization within a hospital over time, not
differences in utilization across hospitals.
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We can find only one other paper that considers economies of scope between patients of different
admission type (emergency versus elective), though this unpublished study concludes that “For
the elective dimension, methodological problems may be large enough to cast doubt on the validity
of the results” (Kittelsen and Magnussen 2003). The closest paper to ours, and also the most
methodologically rigorous, is by Gaynor et al. (2015). This paper separates DRGs into primary,
secondary and tertiary levels (approximately based on how widely they are provided, especially
in teaching hospitals), and then examines whether there are economies of scope between medical
specialties within each level, and whether there are economies of scope across levels. However,
this study uses only a single year of data and 324 data points, taking hospital level total annual
operating expenses to be the dependent variable. This study is therefore conducted at both a
higher unit of analysis than ours and lacks a panel data structure, and therefore suffers from the
weaknesses laid out in our paper.
Over the next few pages we provide a summary of the results of our literature search.
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